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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is designed to illuminate options that I believe have
been difficult for advocates of gay rights to imagine due to an incessant
culture war and the hard work of anti-gay forces that have kept pro-gay
advocates under persistent fire. The culture war, this paper argues, while
a fundraising boon and a media draw, compels a particular type of par-
ticipation and a particular reform agenda, eclipsing reform possibilities
that might be preferable in the long run.
From its side of the culture war, the anti-gay camp often speaks in
the language of protecting traditional family values. This elicits at least
two species of rejoinders from gay rights advocates.
Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. My thanks go to Anastasia
Dubrovsky, Jeremy Fredericksen, Brittney Lacy and Rose MacKenzie for their re-
search assistance. Thanks also to many colleagues who provided useful feedback,
including Stacey Dogan, Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Taylor Flynn, Janet Halley, Wendy
Parmet, Dean Spade, fellow participants in the series of workshops entitled Up
Against Family Law Exceptionalism, sponsored by the Program on Law and Social
Thought at Harvard Law School, and participants in the Faculty Colloquium at
Northeastern University School of Law.
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First, gay rights advocates depict the gay family as morally indis-
tinct from an idealized version of the heterosexual family, i.e.,
wholesome, monogamous, bourgeois and much more about love than
sex. This is a drive toward a species of normalization. It is especially evi-
dent in the same-sex marriage campaign, but shows up on other
frontiers, as well, and it has had under-recognized (though not entirely
un-theorized) costs.
Second, gay rights advocates fight to impose on the battle their pre-
ferred frame of civil rights and equality. The history of civil rights and
equality in the United States makes these terms powerful rhetorical
tools, but their hazards-while subject to extensive academic discus-
sion-too often seem to elude the architects of major reform
movements.
This Article will recount the dangers of both normalization and
rights discourses, but not without recognizing how powerful the pull
toward them can be under conditions of a culture war. Still, my call will
be to resist that pull. Fighting the oppressive forces of sexual moralism
can be done in other-and very possibly more productive-ways that
do not replicate the problems of normalization or rights discourse.
This Article will propose other ways, mindful of the insights of a
handful of critical theoretic traditions, including American Legal Real-
ism, Critical Legal Theory, and Queer Theory, which I believe have
something real and valuable to offer the gay rights movement if what its
participants want is to combat sexual moralism and to ameliorate the
full range of hardships faced by persons associated with marginal gender
or sexual identities or practices. Collectively, these traditions give us
some tools for appreciating the drawbacks of the gay rights agenda as it
is currently formulated, open a way of thinking about how legal and
economic conditions-conditions that are potentially alterable through
law reform-contribute to the formation of our gendered and sexual
identities, add to our options for organizing our erotic and domestic
lives, and could lead to a new way of conceiving a law reform agenda.
The agenda imagined in this Article is less consumed with achieving
formal equality between gay and straight people, and more interested in
using law to create the best possible conditions under which a broad
array of people can make choices.
Part II discusses what I deem to be the difficulties with the current
gay rights model, and in particular the way in which the reform agenda
has been overly determined by the culture war. Next, Part III begins the
process of re-imagining a law reform agenda along new lines, proposing
concrete examples of how the insights of the critical theoretic traditions
might be put to reformist purposes. My hope is to avoid acquiescing to
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the toxic demands of the culture war, to learn from these traditions, and
to make a turn to an articulate and useful blend of what they offer.
II. FIGHTING A CULTURE WAR
The rhetoric of the contemporary American culture war is
familiar-stale, really. It addresses issues ranging from gun control to
abortion, from sex education to physician assisted suicide, from prayer
in schools to stem cell research, spanning legal as well as popular venues.
This part will recall the terms of just one of the culture war's several
frontiers: the battle over progress in the treatment of gay, lesbian, bisex-
ual and transgender (GLBT) people' and the status of same-sex erotic
and domestic relations.
A. Anti-Gay Mainstays
In his State of the Union Address in 2005, President George W
Bush said:
Our second great responsibility to our children and grandchil-
dren is to honor and to pass along the values that sustain a free
society. So many of my generation, after a long journey, have
come home to family and faith, and are determined to bring
up responsible, moral children. Government is not the source
of these values, but government should never undermine
them.
Because marriage is a sacred institution and the foundation of
society, it should not be re-defined by activist judges. For the
1. I am cognizant of the difficulties of the "GLBT" litany to describe a range of people
among whom there are numerous differences, for example, the danger that trans-
gender issues will be collapsed into or eclipsed by gay issues. Forgive my use of
"GLBT" here, and the even more obscuring term "gay," to cover a diverse array of
people and concerns. My use of the term "gay" in particular refers more often to the
archetypal subject of gay rights litigation than to an actual kind of human being. In
fact, one purpose of the article will be to demonstrate how identity based law reform
is restricted in its capacity to ameliorate many of the adverse legal conditions faced by
persons on the sexual and gender margins. I also make these vocabulary choices for
reasons of economy, particularly in the first half of the article. In the second half, in
which I make an effort to articulate a new approach to agenda setting, the differences
among and contingencies within these identities will be given more careful attention.
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good of families, children, and society, I support a constitu-
tional amendment to protect the institution of marriage.
Whether or not you listened to this address, it probably sounds familiar.
The terms "values," "moral," "faith," "sacred," and "family" are main-
stays of the anti-gay right.
Observe as well the customary condemnation of judicial activism.
The Americans to whom the above-excerpted lines probably are meant
to appeal do not seem prone to inquire why judges are ill-suited to ad-
dressing a "values" question such as how marriage ought to be defined.
Any law school graduate ought to understand the logic, but it is not
clear that the rest of the electorate would. My instinct is that few Ameri-
cans, if asked, actually could explain the reasoning, but that the link has
been rhetorically drummed into them.
1. Judicial Decisions Invoking Insitutitional Competence
Of course, in legal discourse, the whole idea of judicial competence
and its limits is routine. I recount it nonetheless for a few reasons. First,
I want to demonstrate some discursive continuity across the le-
gal/popular divide while also highlighting a distinction between the
commonly elaborated rationale for judicial deference and the poorly
grasped rhetorical refrain. Second, while the rationale is in widespread
use throughout constitutional law, it can be critiqued; I will provide a
brief reminder of how that might go. Finally, a bit of anti-gay rights
rhetoric contextualizes the pro-gay rejoinders that follow and it is the
pro-gay arguments with which I am ultimately concerned.
A few key cases will suffice to recall the jurisprudential incarnation.
In Lawrence v. Texas,' the 2003 decision of the United States Supreme
Court striking down a Texas sodomy prohibition under the due process
clause, Justice Thomas (along with Chief Justice Rehnquist) joined in a
lengthy dissent authored by the reliable culture warrior, Justice Scalia.!
2. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005)
(transcript available at George W. Bush White House Archives, Press Release, State
of the Union Address, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2005/02/20050202-11 html).
3. I have not conducted a scientific study on this, but I have made a handful of informal
inquiries among smart, educated non-lawyers (e.g., "what is judicial activism and
why is it wrong?") and my intuition has been almost uniformly vindicated that is,
most have no idea what theoretically ought to distinguish a proper judicial action
from an improper one. Try it.
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Despite Justice Scalia's customary incisiveness and thoroughness, how-
ever, Justice Thomas submitted an additional dissent'-a mere two
paragraphs-signed only by him. Justice Thomas reasoned:
I write separately to note that the law before the Court today
"is . . . uncommonly silly." If I were a member of the Texas
Legislature, I would vote to repeal it....
Notwithstanding this, I recognize that as a Member of this
Court I am not empowered to help petitioners and others
similarly situated. My duty, rather, is to "decide cases 'agreea-
bly to the Constitution and laws of the United States.'",
Presumably, Justice Thomas could not persuade Justice Scalia to incor-
porate this sentiment into his opinion or the case would include only a
single dissent. His two paragraphs establish Justice Thomas as perhaps a
bit less rabid than his conservative colleagues on the Lawrence Court
and this might be what he hoped to convey. The same paragraphs, how-
ever, establish Justice Thomas as a culture warrior-not simply because
he voted with the conservative wing of the Court on a divisive social
issue, but because by articulating as he did the distinction between what
he would do as a legislator and what he must do as a judge, he fortified
the cable connecting the popular and legal discourses of the right in this
substantive domain. In particular, this kinder, gentler culture warrior
fused his vote for traditional, family-values style moralism to a conclu-
sory pronouncement of the limit of judicial competence.
Justice Scalia, of course, performs this rhetorical task much more
intently and elaborately, in his Lawrence dissent and also in his dissent
6. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
8. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). After charging the majority
with taking sides in the culture war and observing with apparent empathy that for
reasons of morality "[many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children,
as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in their home," id. at 602-03,
Justice Scalia assumes a more neutral posture.
Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other
group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means.... But
persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views in
the absence of democratic majority will is something else. . . . What Texas
has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic action,
and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new
"constitutional right" by a Court that is impatient with democratic change.
Id. at 603.
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in Rorer v. Evans,' the decision striking down on equal protection
grounds an anti-gay amendment to Colorado's constitution. Justice
White and Chief Justice Burger, however, preceded Justice Scalia in their
majority and concurring opinions (respectively) in Bowers v. Hardwick,"
upholding a Georgia sodomy statute, shortly before Justice Scalia's eleva-
tion to the Supreme Court. Justice White, writing for the majority, was
clear that the case "d[id] not require a judgment on whether laws against
sodomy . . . are wise or desirable."" "The issue presented," he famously
explained, was "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy," adding that the case did
entail the need for him to exercise "some judgment about the limits of
the Court's role in carrying out its constitutional mandate."12 justice
White proceeded to reject the finding made in the Court of Appeals that
the Supreme "Court's prior cases have construed the Constitution to
confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy." In fact,
Justice White admonished, nothing in the privacy line of cases "bears
any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right" asserted by Hard-
wick.'4 References to the Lochner Era and FDR's court-packing plan
come a few pages later just to make sure that we got the point: this is
not a matter for the Court. 1
Chief Justice Burger joined the main opinion, but wrote separately
to form a kind of reverse parallel structure to the Scalia and Thomas pair
9. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). "The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a
fit of spite," Justice Scalia begins, id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting), presumably sug-
gesting that the battle over the legal status of gays is a quintessential political and
cultural brawl between two large-scale players such as Bismarck and the Roman
Catholic Church, not a matter of a bigoted majority and a minority in need of equal
protection. He goes even further by describing the anti-gay state constitutional
amendment as "a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve tradi-
tional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise
those mores . . . ." Id. Justice Scalia soon turns to the institutional side of the dis-
course, arguing that "[tlhis Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the
resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are
selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality ... is evil." Id. In addi-
tion to his skillful interweaving of the moral and the institutional, notice how Justice
Scalia summons class resentment against the "politically powerful" gay minority and
the "elite class" to which the justices belong. The message is that the Court is siding
not with a weak minority that needs counter-majoritarian protection, but rather with
a disproportionately powerful minority that has effectively captured the thinking of
the aristocracy.
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
12. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
13. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
14. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
15. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
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of dissents that followed by seventeen years. It took the Chief Justice
three paragraphs to distinguish himself as a bit more hostile than his
brethren in the majority, tapping Blackstone for the language of "the
infamous crime against nature," "an offense of 'deeper malignity' than
rape," and "a heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature.' "6 To find a fundamental right in such depravity would,
Chief Justice Burger wrote, "cast aside millennia of moral teaching, -
but he could not wrap up there. He needed one more paragraph, which
strangely sounds almost as if he does not himself hold an opinion on the
subject of sodomy: "This is essentially not a question of personal 'prefer-
ences' but rather of the legislative authority of the State. I find nothing
in the Constitution depriving a State of the power to enact the statute
challenged here."
The joint that binds the moral condemnation-as bald as any legis-
lative tirade-to the technocratic pronouncement regarding institutional
competence-designed to sound a bit more neutral in tone-is, of
course, a transparently ideological deposit into what are otherwise va-
cant gate-keeping concepts, such as whether a right is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"'9 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."20 Moreover, the justices in Bowers were construing the
right to privacy, which has been rather widely critiqued as a cloak for
judicial political preference.2 These terms compose the discursive cul-
ture of substantive due process jurisprudence, and so should not be met
here with shock. I exhibit them as a reminder of the rhetorical connec-
tion between anti-gay morality and institutional competence, as well as
of the jurisprudential justification for their entwinement.
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,22 the Massachusetts
case extending marriage rights to same-sex couples under the state
16. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
17. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
18. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
19. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)). See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting),
for an early critique of the Palko formulation precisely on the point of it serving as a
thin veil for judicial policy preference.
20. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
21. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971) (criticizing the right to privacy as found in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and arguing that "[w]hen the Constitution has not spoken,
the Court will be able to find no scale, other than its own value preferences, upon
which to weigh" a minority's freedom claim against the majority's regulatory power);
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and The Market: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983) (critiquing the public/private distinction).
22. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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constitution, the dissenting justices represented themselves as firmly
disposed to the Thomas tonality. To those of us located in the
Massachusetts legal culture, it would be difficult to imagine a
contemporary justice of that court denigrating homosexual sex with
Blackstonian epithet. Instead, the three dissenters (on a court of seven
members), each of whom authored a dissent as well as signed the
dissents of the others, stressed the institutional competence side of the
discourse, even occasionally nodding to the possibility that the marriage
statute might be worth legislative reconsideration. 23 Despite the absence
of Scalia/Burger-style vitriol on the Massachusetts court, however, a
close reading reveals the same rhetorical entwinement.
Justice Spina, for example, began his dissent:
What is at stake in this case is not the unequal treatment of
individuals or whether individual rights have been impermis-
sibly burdened, but the power of the Legislature to effectuate
social change without interference from the courts. . . . Today,
the court has transformed its role as protector of individual
rights into the role of creator of rights.24
Why is this not a question ofrights?, one might ask the justice. His answer
is that the court, "using the rubric of due process ... has redefined mar-
riage." 25 The definition of marriage and the scope of its fundamental
nature are to be drawn from the "nation's history," resulting in a similar
analysis to the one that led the Bowers majority and Lawrence dissenters
to determine that sodomy was not entitled to constitutional protec-
.26
tion.
23. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 983 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
24. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 974 (Spina, J., dissenting).
25. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting).
26. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 976 (Spina, J., dissenting). In the more recent decision by
the Supreme Court of California requiring that state to grant marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), a dissenting jus-
tice made a similar cluster of arguments. Justice Baxter wrote "[i]n reaching this
decision, I believe, the majority violates the separation of powers, and thereby com-
mits a profound error," id. at 456 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting), going on to
charge that "a bare majority of this court, not satisfied with the pace of democratic
change, now abruptly forestalls that process and substitutes, by judicial flat, its own
social policy views for those expressed by the People themselves.... [T]he majority
creates a new constitutional right." Id. at 457 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Baxter makes explicit reference to a state constitutional "separation of powers
clause," id. at 458 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting), and to the conventional
terms of fundamental rights analysis as "crucial restraints upon the overreaching exer-
cise of judicial authority in violation of the separation of powers." Id. at 459 (Baxter,
J., concurring and dissenting). Consistent with this, Justice Baxter also urges that
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Justice Sosman's dissent shares Justice Spina's solicitude for the leg-
islature, but is focused on the uncertainty of science and the
consequential proper outcome of the rational basis test.2
Based on our own philosophy of child rearing, and on our ob-
servations of the children being raised by same-sex couples to
whom we are personally close, we may be of the view that
what matters to children is not the gender, or sexual orienta-
tion, or even the number of the adults who raise them, but
rather whether those adults provide the children with a nur-
turing, stable, safe, consistent and supportive environment in
which to mature. . .. It is therefore understandable that the
court might view the traditional definition of marriage as an
unnecessary anachronism, rooted in historical prejudices....
It is not, however, our assessment that matters. Conspicuously
absent from the court's opinion today is any acknowledgement
that the attempts at scientific study of the ramifications of rais-
ing children in same-sex couple households are themselves in
their infancy and have so far produced inconclusive and con-
flicting results.
"plaintiffs seek, and the majority grants, a new right to same-sex marriage[.]" Id. at
462 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). Note that this case was effectively overruled
by "Proposition 8," the voter referendum that amended the California constitution to
limit marriage to the union of a man and a woman. See Dan Morain & Jessica Garri-
son, Backers Focused Prop. 8 Battle Beyond Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008,
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-gaymarriage6-2008nov06,0,233181 5.story.
About a week before the law in California was restored to its status quo ante, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut awarded the same-sex marriage campaign a victory in
that state. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
Some familiar arguments show up in this case (e.g., if marriage is to be changed, "it is
appropriate that it be done by the democratic process, rather than by judicial fiat," id.
at 504 (Borden, J., dissenting)). Much of the disagreement between the majority and
dissent, however, focused on whether gays are properly understood as politically pow-
erless enough to warrant treatment as a suspect class. See id. at 439, 487-88.
27. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
28. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting). A few pages later, Justice
Sosman invites the reader to consider whether the court would find irrationality in a
less emotional but analogous context:
[I]f the issue were government subsidies and tax benefits promoting use of
an established technology for energy efficient heating, the court would find
no equal protection or due process violation in the Legislature's decision
not to grant the same benefits to an inventor or manufacturer of some new,
alternative technology who did not yet have sufficient data to prove that
the new technology was just as good as the established technology.
Id. at 981 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
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In the absence of scientific certainty, Justice Sosman reasoned, the legis-
lature cannot be said to be irrational for waiting until the data are in.29
This dissent is at pains to avoid affront; one can almost feel Justice
Sosman pleading with her gay friends to understand that she thinks they
are fine parents-it is just that the studies are not in yet, so she can-
not-despite her personal open-mindedness-find that the legislature
has been irrational.o Her decision is based strictly on institutional con-
cerns.
Embedded in Justice Sosman's reasoning is her apparent confidence
that heterosexual marriage has been an irrefutable triumph. Indeed, she
urges in her opening paragraph that "the Legislature need only have some
rational basis for concluding that ... alternate family structures have not
yet been conclusively shown to be the equivalent of the marital family
structure that has established itself as a successful one over a period of cen-
turies."" None of the justices question this assumption, or even
contemplate that the legislature's requiring same-sex marriage to prove
itself while not requiring heterosexual marriage to do the same might raise
a constitutional issue. This, I believe, is the spot to dig if one seeks to un-
earth evidence of Justice Sosman's acquiescence to the rhetorical
entwinement of anti-gay morality and morally neutral assessments of ju-
dicial competence: heterosexual relationships benefit from the assumption
of success while homosexual relationships begin as suspect.
Justice Cordy concluded the longest of the three dissents with
equivalent courtesy. "While the courageous efforts of many have re-
sulted in increased dignity, rights, and respect for gay and lesbian
members of our community, the issue presented here is a profound one,
deeply rooted in social policy, that must, for now, be the subject of legis-
lative not judicial action." 2 This opinion echoes that of Justice Sosman
29. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 981 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
30. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 982 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
[T]here is much to be said for the argument that excluding gay and lesbian
couples from the benefits of civil marriage is cruelly unfair and hopelessly
outdated; the inability to marry has a profound impact on the personal
lives of committed gay and lesbian couples (and their children) to whom
we are personally close (our friends, neighbors, family members, classmates,
and co workers) ....
Id. See also the separate dissenting opinion of California Justice Corrigan, who wrote,
"In my view, Californians should allow our gay and lesbian neighbors to call their un-
ions marriages. But I, and this court, must acknowledge that a majority of
Californians hold a different view." In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 468 (Corrigan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
31. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 979 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
32. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1004-05 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
156 [Vol. 16:147
on the point that until there is certainty that the same-sex-headed
household is equal to the unquestionably successful heterosexual house-
hold, the court ought to defer to the legislature," but goes perhaps a bit
further in suggesting that marriage is designed to organize the procrea-
tive capacity of heterosexual intercourse and so can be rationally
confined to that context." His argument veers back and forth between
the pragmatics of reproduction and the morality-laden language of his-
tory and tradition.
2. Popular Discourse of Institutional Competence
It is useful to bear in mind the jurisprudential justifications for ju-
dicial deference on gay issues when turning to popular discourse on the
same topic. Take, for example, the lay advocates of amending the United
States Constitution to preclude same-sex marriage, who speak in terms
virtually identical to those of the conservative justices (if sometimes in a
slightly more antagonistic tone). The national organization Focus on the
Family, which has advocated a federal amendment, confronts on its
website in "frequently asked questions" format, why homosexuals should
not be entitled to the same treatment as heterosexuals. The answer reads
in part:
Here's what is intolerant. Same-sex "marriage" is being forced
upon us by a small, but elite, group of individuals dressed in
black robes-judges-who say that thousands of years of hu-
man history have simply been wrong. That is a very arrogant
notion that will bring great harm to our culture. 6
Similar efforts have been made to amend the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights. A layperson's guide produced by the Massachusetts Family
Institute pointedly entitled Take Back Democracy, coaches would-be
activists with the following talking points:
33. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 1003 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
34. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
35. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985-87 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
36. Glenn T. Stanton, Is Marriage in Jeopardy: Are You Confused About What 'Marriage"
Really Means Today?, as reprinted at http://www.focusonthefamily.ca/tfn/family/
PDF/Marriage-in-jeopardy.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
37. MASS. FAMILY INST., TAKE BACK DEMOCRACY: A CITIZENS ACTION GUIDE TO PRE-
SERVING MARRIAGE IN MASSACHUSETTS, available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20031217074602/www.mafamily.org/Citizens+Tool+Kit.pdf (archived Dec. 17,
2003).
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* The SJC, in its narrow 4-3 ruling on homosexual mar-
riage, upset the balance of powers between the three
branches of government. The Court hijacked the power of
the Legislature-and of the people-by declaring a
"C right" to homosexual marriage without legislative action
or a vote of the people.
* A single judge (appointed, not elected) radically changed
the timeless definition of marriage as the union of one
man and one woman. This one judge robbed the power
to legislate from 200 elected representatives and senators
and ultimately from millions of registered Massachusetts
voters.
* With its Goodridge decision, the Court has now invented
a "right" to homosexual marriage, claiming great numbers
of children in homosexual homes who need protection
[sic].
Notice that the national group uses quotation marks around the
word "marriage," while the state group saves the marks for the word
"right." I take the former to be more substantively anti-gay, going di-
rectly to the illegitimacy of same-sex relationships, while the latter aims
at the structural dimension, suggesting that in the absence of a genuine
right, the court has behaved inappropriately. Perhaps the choices were
accidental. Either way, the two excerpts encompass both aspects of the
discourse, just weighted a bit differently and offered without any evi-
dence of thoughtfulness about the limits of judicial competence, but
merely in the mode of an anti-gay-entwined-with-anti-judicial battle
cry.
Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller has written a lengthy and detailed analy-
sis of anti-same-sex marriage strategies, including the anti-judicial
rhetoric, much of it in the context of Hawaii, which saw a promising
same-sex marriage litigation undercut by a state constitutional amend-
ment after an aggressive public campaign.3 ' According to Goldberg-
Hiller, the anti-gay right deployed an elaborate, dual-stranded strategy
38. Id. at 5.
39. JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007). See also HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (restricting
marriage to heterosexual unions); Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572C (2006) (creating a non-marital partner status with benefits similar to those
available under state marriage law); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (hold-
ing that the state needed a compelling interest to justify depriving same-sex couples
of marriage rights).
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that has had an impact on Americans' understanding of civil rights more
generally. First, he identifies
a reaction against the fast-growing visibility of gays and lesbi-
ans and the forms of knowledge and political presentation of
the self under which the demand for civil rights has been
made. This has created a responsive set of political strategies
that use lesbian and gay identities and political claims as an
"alter" against which majorities have realized their opposing
.40interests.
But Goldberg-Hiller does not think this is the entire story. He discerns a
second component:
The rhetorical tactics used to retain the privilege of marriage
for nongays have combined formerly diverse, contradictory,
and sometimes dormant American discourses into mutual co-
herence, amplifying their effects. This hybrid political
language has sampled from liberal and nonliberal political ide-
ologies, neoliberal economic notions, nationalist ideas of
political space, religious morality, themes of civilization, and
even-indeed, especially-from the discourse of civil rights.
Cobbled together, these discourses aid the constitution of new
identities capable of building majorities and driving them to
the polls in opposition to courts and rights-based move-
41
ments.
Goldberg-Hiller illustrates in vivid and sophisticated fashion how courts
and law have become rhetorically entangled with gay identity and how
together they have been posited as threats to a host of prized values such
as family and order.
3. Critique of the Institutional Competence Arguments
These rhetorical ties between substance and institutional compe-
tence-while routinely deployed and virtually instinctive to persons
with legal training and apparently unquestioned by laypersons who
might not even understand the structural rationale undergirding their
40. GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 39, at 7.
41. Id. at 7-8.
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own position-are nonetheless eminently vulnerable to critique. In
abridged form, the critique might go something like this:
* All sides agree that it is the province of the court to inter-
pret the constitutional text-in the case of Goodridge, for
example, the equality42 and due process guarantees of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
* Still, if one reads those provisions to mean that a gay per-
son cannot be denied the right to enter into a marriage
with his or her chosen mate just as a heterosexual person
may, then one would also believe that the Massachusetts
court acted within its proper institutional bounds, merely
enforcing the constitutional terms.
* If, however, one reads the same provisions to mean that
while no gay person can be denied the right to enter into
a heterosexual union on the same terms as a heterosexual
person, the provisions do not entail the additional right to
choose the sex of one's mate, then one would also believe
42. Article I of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by the Equal Rights
Amendment, provides as follows:
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because
of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.
MASS. CONST. art. I, amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVI.
43. Article X provides in relevant part as follows: "Each individual of the society has a
right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according
to standing laws." MASS. CONST. art. X. While the term "due process" does not ap-
pear in this Article (which otherwise closely tracks the language of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution), the due process requirement has
been implied. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975 (Mass.
2003) (Spina, J., dissenting).
44. This is Justice Cordy's view. "The classification is not drawn between men and
women or between heterosexuals and homosexuals, any of whom can obtain a license
to marry a member of the opposite sex; rather it is drawn between same-sex couples
and opposite sex couples." Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 994 (Cordy, J., dissenting). A
dissenting justice in the California marriage case agreed. See In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 462-63 (Cal. 2008) (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that a new right was being invented by the majority and that the case bore no relation
to California's state court case striking down an anti-miscegenation statute (citing
Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (1948))). The California majority, however, saw the
choice of marital partner as encompassed in the right to marry. See Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d at 399. See also infra Part II for a discussion of analogy to federal miscege-
nation decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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that the Massachusetts court exceeded its role of protect-
ing constitutionally guaranteed rights and behaved in an
"activist" manner.
In order to arrive at a position on the institutional ques-
tion, one must first-explicitly or not-consult one's
position on how to construe constitutional terms such as
"equal" and make a substantive judgment about the mer-
its of the plaintiffs' claims. One's view of the correct
outcome comes before one's view of the court's compe-
tence.
The purpose of this kind of critique is to foreground the decision-
maker's political choice. When a judge disavows his or her institutional
competence in the manner described above, or when a political actor
such as President Bush charges a court with "judicial activism," that
judge or actor is making a claim about what the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers requires. The claim of judicial incompetence is
ostensibly neutral rather than driven by policy or outcome preference.
The utility of the critique is to expose the pretense of this neutrality. It
flushes out the hidden politics and renders them visible and accessible
for conscious consideration. It exposes the ultimate indistinctness of
Justices Thomas and Scalia, or the well-mannered Massachusetts dissent-
ing justices and the more vulgar anti-gay backers of the constitutional
amendments.
One conceivable strategy for countering the rhetorical obfuscation
promoted by the right would be to spread the critique with equal vigor
in the hope of exposing the anti-gay sentiment that masquerades as po-
litically disinterested concern for the constitutional structure. It might
win over those who see themselves as the fair-minded middle. Pro-gay
advocates, however, cannot often be heard levying this sort of critique.
The next sub-part recounts what those advocates tend to offer instead.
B. The Terms of Pro-Gay Advocacy
1. Normalization, Especially the Sex-Family Distinction
In April, 2005, a little boy in kindergarten in Lexington,
Massachusetts brought home from school a "diversity book bag."" In it
was a children's book entitled Who's in a Family? that depicts a variety of
45. See James Vaznis & Tracy Jan, In Storm Over Gay Books, a Principal Holds Ground,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 2006, at Bl.
1612009] THE GAY AGENDA
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
families, including a single-parent family, a bi-racial family, a family with
divorced parents and a family with same-sex parents. When the boy's
father, David Parker, learned that same-sex parenting was being
presented to his son as a legitimate familial arrangement, he set off for
the elementary school and refused to leave school grounds until
administrators agreed to excuse his son from any further instruction on
that point. Instead of conceding to Parker, the principal called the
police and Parker was arrested for trespassing.48 He refused bail and so
spent the night in jail, consequently becoming a cause calkbre for the
anti-gay right.4 9 Fred Phelps's organization, the Westboro Baptist
Church (an independent church, the slogan of which is "God hates
fags"), came to Lexington to demonstrate; then-Governor Mitt
Romney made a public statement in support of parental rights; and
MassResistance, the Commonwealth's premier anti-gay marriage
organization, came to Parker's aid and supported the unsuccessful
federal lawsuit he and his wife filed against the town of Lexington. 52
Parker raised constitutional claims, including claims arising under
the substantive due process right to parent and the free exercise clause,
46. See id.; ROBERT SKUTCH & LAURA NIENHAUS, WHO'S IN A FAMILY? (1995).
47. See Vaznis & Jan, supra note 45.
48. See id
49. See Maria Sacchetti, In Lexington, Fear Surrounds Players in Flap Over Gay Teachings,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 2006, at B1.
50. Cf Vaznis & Jan, supra note 45 (reporting that out-of-state groups came to Lexing-
ton to demonstrate).
51. See Maria Cramer & Ralph Ranalli, Arrested Father Had Point to Make, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2005, at BI.
52. See Sacchetti, supra note 49. See also Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.
Mass. 2007), affd, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). The Parkers were joined in their law-
suit by another family that was disgruntled with the Lexington school district's
provision of positive gay imagery; the Wirthlins' second-grader listened to a reading
of a fairy-tale entitled King & King about two princes who fall in love. Parker, 474 F.
Supp. 2d at 266. See also LINDA DE HAAN & STERN NIJLAND, KING & KING (2002).
53. Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 263. The federal district court dismissed the constitutional
claims based largely on a First Circuit case, which "held that the constitutional right
of parents to raise their children does not include the right to restrict what a public
school may teach their children and that teachings which contradict a parent's reli-
gious beliefs do not violate their First Amendment right to exercise their religion." Id.
(quoting Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 534, 539 (1st Cir.
1995)). The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, relying on slightly different rea-
soning:
The heart of the plaintiffs' free exercise claim is a claim of "indoctrination":
that the state has put pressure on their children to endorse an affirmative
view of gay marriage and has thus undercut the parents' efforts to inculcate
their children with their own opposing religious views. . . . Plaintiffs'
pleadings do not establish a viable case of indoctrination.
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and also alleged that the school district violated a state statute, which
provides (in relevant part) as follows:
Every city, town, regional school district or vocational school
district implementing or maintaining curriculum which pri-
marily involves human sexual education or human sexuality
issues shall adopt a policy ensuring parental/guardian notifica-
tion. Such policy shall afford parents or guardians the
flexibility to exempt their children from any portion of said
curriculum through written notification to the school princi-
pal. No child so exempted shall be penalized by reason of such
55
exemption.
Parker's argument was that the statute entitled him to notice in advance
of the lesson to his son's kindergarten class as well as to the right to have
his son excused from the class. The school district's position, joined by
the American Civil Liberties Union, a couple of gay rights organizations
and others," was that the statute did not apply." As the amicus memo-
randum in support of the school district's motion to dismiss argued,
None of the books objected to by the plaintiffs here are part of
a curriculum "prinarily["] about "sexual education" or "hu-
man sexuality issues" for purposes of the statute, and thus fall
outside of its scope. The books about which the plaintiffs
complain are simply stories that contain gay characters-a far
cry from the type of content implicated by the statute. The ar-
gument that depictions of gay characters constitute sex
education or "sexual" content would mean that depictions of
families with a husband and wife as parents are also about
sexuality education, a plainly absurd notion. The promotion
of tolerance, acknowledgement of diversity, and discussion of
Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 105 (1st Cir. 2008).
54. See Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 263. State claims were dismissed without prejudice to
allow the plaintiffs to bring them in state court. See id. at 278. I found nothing to in-
dicate that the plaintiffs have done so.
55. MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § 32A (2002).
56. Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
57. See Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (listing amici).
58. See Parker, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 264, 266, 278. The school district and amici also ar-
gued that the statute creates no private right of action. See id. at 264.
1632009] THE GAY AGENDA
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
equal treatment and rights of gay people in society is not "sex
education."
As the Boston Globe reported, school officials stated "that the material
was about families, not sexuality."o6
This argument holds a certain understandable appeal. One can
draw a relatively coherent line between the children's books at issue and,
for example, a lesson about how to use a condom. It is a line that the
Massachusetts Department of Education arguably drew in its regulation
interpreting the statute,6 1 and one can understand why the school dis-
trict and its allies would articulate the division in this case. The pro-gay
side is trying to de-stigmatize same-sex relationships and make them
seem not importantly different from heterosexual relationships-not
more sexual or threatening than the traditional mother/father/child
formation and therefore not warranting the excess of deference to paren-
tal preferences that is required under the state's sex education law.
Still, the argument, with its insistence on a sharp dichotomy be-
tween "families with . . . parents" and "human sexuality" ought to come
under some critical scrutiny in my view. The argument suggests and
promotes a sex-family distinction, so that a book can manage to teach
about how some kids have two mothers or two fathers, but still not be
59. Memorandum Amicus Curiae from the ACLU of Massachusetts, Lexington
C.A.R.E.S., Lexington Teachers Association, Massachusetts Teachers Association,
Respecting Differences, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Human Rights
Campaign, and the Human Rights Campaign Foundation in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, at 19 (2006) (on file with author).
The defendants' own memorandum made the same point:
The defendants deny that the books ... involve "human sexual education"
or "human sexuality issues ... King and King ... no more "primarily in-
volves human sexual education or human sexual activity" than Snow White
and the Seven Dwarfs, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, Beauty and the Beast, or
The Princess and the Pea, all of which similarly involve romance. Simply
because the characters who live happily ever after at the close of the story
happen to be members of the same gender does not mean the book [pri-
marily] involves sex.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint, at 21 (2006) (on file with author).
60. Vaznis & Jan, supra note 45.
61. In title 603, section 5.02 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, the Department
interprets the statutory terms to refer to "courses (typically, sex education or discrete
units of a health education or biology course), school assemblies or other instruc-
tional activities and programs for which the instruction and materials focus
principally on human sexual education, the biological processes of human reproduc-
tion and sexual development, or human sexuality issues." 603 MASS. CODE REGS.
5.02 (1987).
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about sexuality. The gays who have children, it starts to seem, are some-
how not quite the same gays as those who have sexuality. The split
recalls the virgin-whore dichotomy to which feminists have so long ob-
jected.62 The gays in the children's books are virgins, not whores, or63
alternatively, good gays, not bad gays.
But what is most noticeable to me about this formulation, this
downplaying of the "sex" in sexual orientation while working overtime
to depict the gay family as a legitimate and morally upstanding fragment
in the multicultural mosaic, is its endemism to the culture war. The sex-
family dichotomy was not forged in Lexington; it is a trope, and the
trope can be heard coming from culture warriors of all stripes.
Most obviously, the right wing has promoted the division to ad-
vance its anti-gay agenda. The very fact that the plaintiffs portray the
children's books in question as regarding sexuality, while presumably not
understanding Goldilocks and the Three Bears (which you will recall in-
volves a mama, a papa, and a baby bear) as regarding sexuality to the
same extent, says plenty. Apparently, heterosexual sex within the con-
fines of marriage is hardly sex at all. (Those bears were married, right?)
The very rhetoric of "family values," as invoked against an array of mat-
ters concerning sex, including but not limited to homosexuality,64
promotes the dichotomization.
But the trope is not the sole province of the anti-gay camp. Pro-gay
advocates promote the same distinction, and when they do, they are al-
ready playing on the field of sexual moralism-exactly where the right-
wing wants them.
62. For relatively contemporary references in law review articles, see, e.g., Mary Becker,
Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLAWOMEN'S L.J. 165, 189 (1998),
and Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power ofDiscourse, Dis-
courses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv. 869,
929-43 (1996). For more foundational examples from feminist classics, sometimes
using Mary and Eve as the archetypal figures, see, e.g., MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY
231 (1990), and SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEx 144 (H.M. Parshley trans.,
1989) (1952).
63. Another articulation comes from Michael Warner, who wrote that "the image of the
Good Gay is never invoked without its shadow in mind-the Bad Queer, the kind
who has sex, who talks about it, and who builds with other queers a way of life that
ordinary folk do not understand or control." MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE
WITH NORMAL 114 (1999).
64. Opposition to pornography, for example, is sometimes cited as a "family value." See,
e.g., Timothy Egan, Technology Sent Wall Street into Market for Pornography, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at Al (discussing the prosecution of a porn dealer in Utah, in-
cluding both his large consumer base and the public support for his prosecution given
the "family values" orientation of that state).
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The gay marriage campaign is the clearest-albeit not the only-
example. The public relations strategy of the campaign is fairly evident.
While the Goodridge case was pending in Massachusetts, Newsweek ran a
sympathetic, 3300-word article entitled The War Over Gay Marriage,
opening and closing with domestic scenes that featured the named
plaintiff couple.6 1 "It was a homey scene,", 6 the article began. "Standing
in their warm kitchen on a winter's day in 2001, Julie and Hillary
Goodridge, a couple for 16 years, played the old Beatles song 'All You
Need Is Love' for their young daughter, Annie."6 Lest you suspect that
the opening conceit represents solely the intentions of the columnists,
the article reported on the explicit PR strategy of one of the nation's
leading gay rights organizations:
Lambda is trying to soften up public opinion with town-hall
meetings designed to show that gay families are good for the
community. "The town halls we're doing tell people, 'Hey,
we're just like anyone else-a middle-class, hometown subur-
ban couple that's been called boring,"' says Cindy Meneghin,
45, who with her partner, Maureen Kilian, also 45, and their
two children, Joshua, 10, and Sarah, 8, are suing to be recog-
nized as a legal family in New Jersey. "You can't look at our
beautiful, charming kids and not notice that we're a family,
and the myths start tumbling down. What we've found is that
people get to know us as people with families and kids, that I
coach soccer and take pictures, and Maureen is the best dessert
maker in town, and, oh yes, Maureen and Cindy are a gay
couple. 6 1
Let me be clear that I have no problem with suburban parenting, soccer,
or dessert, but something more is going on here. In their eagerness to be
seen as "boring," their pointing to children as evidence that their rela-
tionship is legitimate, their hope to contravene myths, and "oh yes,
[they] are a gay couple," lies something more insidious. My reading of
the subtext of this paragraph is as follows:
Pay no attention to our lesbian sex. Our sex is a small matter
compared with the ways in which we are an ordinary, bourgeois
65. Evan Thomas, The War Over Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38, avail-
able at http://www.newsweek.com/id/57774.
66. Id.
67. Id
6 8. Id.
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family. We're nothing like what you imagine (i.e., practitioners of
anonymous sex in public restrooms). Because sex is only a minor
matter and normalfamily hfe is the big picture, we should not be
marginalized.
If my reading is a plausible one, then the problem that follows is that
Lambda's spokeswomen are conceding that their sex is a negative, some-
thing that must be downplayed in order to bolster their credibility as a
family and make the case for fair legal treatment. Moreover, their plea
contains the implicit concession that those who are leading other life-
styles are morally inferior and less deserving of such fairness.
Lambda's strategy is a species of normalization. As Janet Halley ex-
plains:
Normalisation [in the Foucauldian sense] is not the generation
and imposition of some consolidated idea of good behavior or
good values, the coercive herding of more and more people into
normalcy defined by that behavior or those values; it is the ever-
shifting, provisional ordering of a social, conceptual, and ethical
field around a distinction-say, married/unmarried; or a
range of distinctions-say, wife/mistress/girlfriend; or a stan-
dard-say "room temperature" or "illness" or "reasonableness."
... [E]thical value may or may not emerge as an effect of the
ordering of the field."
The Lambda PR strategy is normalizing in precisely this sense. It
conceptually organizes the social world around the sex-family distinc-
tion. Moreover, in this case, it seems to me that a predominant ethical
valuation does emerge-family is ethically privileged over sex-although
one could take the same basic discursive structure in the obverse and
wind up with the contrary ethical conclusion. Examples can occasionally
be heard coming from pro-sex radicals such as Pat Califia, who-in an
essay about the inadequacy of extending constitutional protection to
sodomy while failing to protect gender deviance and more outlying sex-
ual practices such as S/M-contemptuously spits out the label "lesbian
69. Janet Halley, Recognition, Rights, Regulation, Normalisation: Rhetorics ofJustification in
the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS:
A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 100 n.7 (Robert
Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001) (criticizing William Eskridge's miscom-
prehension of the Foucauldian concept).
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soccer moms"70 or addresses with unconcealed hostility "you, bubba,
with your domestic partner and Jack Russell terrier. My critique is not
meant to render righteous anything belligerent to mainstream values.
Denigrating family with the suggestion that it is anti-sex fortifies the
dichotomy no less than downplaying sex with the implication that it is
adverse to family. One can reinforce the basic dichotomy regardless of
which side one privileges.
The Lambda normalization strategy might be effective in winning
over some people who can find empathy only for those who represent
themselves as modest and unthreatening participants in run-of-the-mill
family forms, but the cost is vilification of homosexual sex (or the val-
orization of sex among pro-sex radicals, but then family starts to look
bad). While the strategy might very well lead to some formal legal victo-
ries, it leaves entirely intact the sexual moralism of the anti-gay right.
Courts that have awarded gay rights advocates with litigation victo-
ries sometimes fortify their opinions using the same strategy. In
Goodridge, the main opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, while (in my
view) admirable for its sober focus on marriage as an administrative and
distributive tool,72 includes a gratuitous list of occupations among the
plaintiffs ("business executives, lawyers, an investment banker, educa-
tors, therapists, and a computer engineer"), noting also that "[im] any are
active in church, community, and school groups." I suppose this could
be read merely as a general introduction to the parties, but one has to
surmise that go-go dancers and Streisand impersonators were not con-
sidered as potential plaintiffs-and that if they had been, this paragraph
would have an entirely different feel. The paragraph as written advances
70. Patrick Califia, Legalized Sodomy is Political Foreplay, in THAT'S REVOLTING!: QUEER
STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 65, 65 (Mattilda, a.k.a. Matt Bernstein
Sycamore ed., 2004).
71. Id. at 67. This did not offend me personally, as I have a Labrador retriever.
72. Save for a lapse here and there about "connection that express[es] our common hu-
manity," Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003), the
Chief Justice does not let discourses of love or sanctity cloud her judgment, e.g., "[iln
short, for all the joy and solemnity that normally attend to marriage, G.L. c. 207,
governing entrance to marriage, is a licensing law." Id. at 952. The California Court
was a bit less sober, extolling "the opportunity to publicly and officially express one's
love for and long-term commitment to another person by establishing a family to-
gether with that person [which] also is an important element of self-expression that
can give special meaning to one's life." In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 425 (Cal.
2008).
73. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949. See also the concluding paragraph of Justice Gre-
aney's concurrence, which again lists the plaintiffs' occupations and mentions their
participation in religious and other "ordinary daily" parts of life. Id. at 973 (Greaney,
J., concurring). The California case includes a similar paragraph. See Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d at 403.
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a sense of normalcy in the bourgeois sense. Admittedly, it might be
beneficial for the compassion-challenged to be reminded that they have
something in common with people whose rights they might otherwise
feel comfortable abrogating, but it is worth asking what less desirable
images these images of bourgeois normalcy are meant to counteract. If
the answer is homosexual sex-and I think it is"-then the normalizing
75imagery comes at a cost.
Even in Lawrence, the normalizing imagery shows up to mute the
sex and bolster the pro-gay reasoning. Justice Kennedy reproached the
Bowers Court for its articulation of the question presented 6 when he
urged that such a framing "demeaned" Michael Hardwick's claim, "just
as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse, and went on to
make clear that Lawrence, a case about sodomy, was not only, or maybe
even mainly, about sodomy: "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one ele-
ment in a personal bond that is more enduring." The men prosecuted
for sodomy in Lawrence did not claim to be forming such a personal
bond, but that they could have dilutes the distaste some readers might
experience for what they were really doing." There is just no denying
that this case is about criminalized sex acts, but the Court nonetheless
relies on a variation on the trope: here, gay sex is tolerable because it can
be part of a legitimate relationship-the kind that heads a family.
Whether the anti-gay right is sensationalizing gay sexuality in order
to delegitimize gay family life, pro-gay advocates or gay-sympathetic
74. Gender deviance might also be among the "myths" that the normalizing imagery is
meant to counteract. Moreover, the imagery might easily leave one with a monolithic
impression as to class.
75. A few people in a workshop setting reacted to this argument by reminding me that it
is helpful for litigators working for social change to humanize their clients and por-
tray them in a manner that enables judges, who might come from more privileged
groups, to identify with them. I do not dispute this. Normalization is not, in my
view, the same thing as humanization or depicting clients sympathetically. The prob-
lem with equating normalization and humanization is that it comes at the expense of
dehumanizing those who may be deprivileged by the norm that is being (re)produced
by the strategy. It might take a bit more thought, but it does not seem to me impos-
sible to depict one's clients as human-real people who need, desire and suffer-
without at the same time implicitly and judgmentally prescribing what they should
need, desire or suffer from in order to be worthy of decent legal treatment.
76. See infra Part II.A.
77. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
78. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
79. I have complained about this before and in greater detail. See Libby Adler, The Dig
nity of Sex, 17 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 1, 18-19 (2008); Libby Adler, The Future of
Sodomy, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 215-18 (2005).
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multiculturalists are normalizing (read: de-sexing) homosexuality in or-
der to legitimize gay family life, or sex radicals are exhibiting disdain for
gay domesticity in order to valorize transgressive sex, the suggestion is
that family and sex are somehow antithetical enterprises. Of course they
are not. If some people experience them that way, however, it might be
because that is the reality that the trope is producing."o
Normalization rhetoric, therefore, and specifically the sex-family
distinction, is political, but not in the sense that it belongs solely to one
side of the culture war. On the contrary, the power of the sex-family
trope lies precisely in its not being the sole property of any one political
camp, but rather in its being a creature of the war itself, so common and
shared as to be difficult to see. This frontier of the culture war is looking
more and more as if it were premised on family's segregation from its
dark sexual side.
It is hard to resist normalizing rhetoric under conditions of a
culture war, with the anti-gay right's compassionless denigration of
same-sex intimacies and gay parenthood, but the hazards of fighting in
these terms have gone under-recognized. It is not clear to me whether
the culture war is winnable, but if it is, and further cementing of the
sex-family distinction is required to do it, the victory will be Pyrrhic. A
victory on those terms cannot possibly be a genuine victory over the
oppressive forces of sexual moralism. At best, it can result in the acquisi-
tion of a few formal rights while reproducing the general framework
that maligns sex and justifies the oppression of persons identified with
marginal sexual practices.
Moreover, the cost of an impossibly entrenched, virtually invisible
dichotomy between family (or parenting) and sex could be staggering.
This is not because people would in the ultimate sense have to choose
between one and the other so that no one could ever have both children
and sex, but because of the possibilities for shame and projection when
people cannot quite manage all of their desires and self-states, and the
political consequences that can flow from that failure.
When looking to the right, pro-gay advocates have no trouble see-
ing this danger. Reaction to the bathroom escapade of Senator Larry
80.
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative
terms: it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it
"conceals". In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces do-
mains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge
that may be gained of him belong to this production.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 194 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (1975).
[Vol. 16:147170
Craig (R-Idaho) (to choose from a mountain of available examples) is a
case in point. A columnist for the San Francisco Bay Times, a newspaper
aimed at gay readers, wrote, "Larry Craig is a confused and closeted gay
man unable to connect the dots between his sexuality and his belief in
marriage and family." Setting aside for the moment the pile of assump-
tions built into this sentence (e.g., the assumption that Craig is gay, as
opposed to bisexual or just a guy who enjoys anonymous bathroom sex
and rarely encounters women in public men's rooms), observe the au-
thor's awareness that one's political beliefs can be driven unconsciously
by what one fears or loathes in oneself.
While perhaps a bit vulgar and overly certain, the columnist's
statement more or less amounts to the basic psychoanalytic insight that
what one cannot consciously manage about one's own desires will find
its way into some neurosis that might easily be acted out to the detri-
ment of others.8 2 When we contemplate the tragic falls of right-wing,
excessively judgmental figures such as Craig, it is easy to imagine that
those who wield the weapon of sexual moralism most menacingly are ill
at ease with their own proclivities. This is not to suggest that every ho-
mophobe is a closeted homosexual, but that behind sexual moralism is a
generalized hatred of that painfully vulnerable human experience of de-
sire. Gay rights proponents know this very well.
What seems harder to remember is that gay-identified people are
perfectly capable of the same unconscious fear and self-loathing, and
that this can take a political toll no less damaging than the one imposed
by Craig. There is no doubt, for example, that normalization strategies
such as the one deployed by the Lambda spokeswomen undermine
queer alliances. The entire volume from which Califia's essay is drawn"
81. Chris Crain, When to Drop the "H" bomb, S.F. BAY TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, available at
http://thetaskforce.org/TF-in-news/07_0909/stories/16_H-bomb.pdf.
82. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 64 James Strachey
trans., 1961) (1930) ("Psycho-Analytic work has shown us that it is precisely these
frustrations of sexual life which people known as neurotics cannot tolerate. The neu-
rotic creates substitutive satisfactions for himself in his symptoms, and these either
cause him suffering in themselves or become sources of suffering for him by raising
difficulties in his relations. . ."); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:
DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 219 (2004) (arguing that branding a group as sexu-
ally deviant is a way of casting out one's sexual shame).
83. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. This is not the only source out there that is
critical or resentful of gay mainstreaming. See, e.g., WARNER, supra note 63, at 97
(characterizing the arguments of a pro-same-sex marriage advocate as "[w]hoever
gets state support first wins. You are free to pursue 'other avenues,' but, of course,
don't blame us if you find yourself stigmatized, abjected, or criminalized. "); id. at 111
(responding to a same-sex marriage proponent that " [w]hen leading gay legal theo-
rists dismiss gay sexuality as mere liberty, uncivilized and uncommitted, it is no
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is a protest by sundry sexual outsiders (e.g., transgender persons, sex
workers, vocal practitioners of S/M) against the mainstreaming impulse
of the gay rights movement and an expression of resentment at being
left out in the cold, as well as a call for a queer politics that is not so de-
voted to the dream of social acceptance. In the introduction, the editor
(whose attack is a bit more focused on consumerism in the gay rights
movement, but who assails gay assimilation in all its aspects) is clear
about the book's unifying theme:
assimilation robs queer identity of anything meaningful, rele-
vant, or challenging-and calls this progress. . . . The gay
mainstream presents a sanitized, straight-friendly version of
gay identity, which makes it safe for David Geffen, Rosie
O'Donnell, or Richard Chamberlain to come out and still
rake in the bucks. By the twisted priorities of this gay main-
stream, it's okay to oppose a queer youth shelter because it
might interfere with "community" property values, or to enact
neighborhood "beautification" programs that require the
wholesale arrest of homeless people, transgendered people, sex
workers, youth, people of color.... As an assimilationist gay
mainstream wields increasing power, the focus of gay struggle
has become limited to the holy trinity of marriage, military
service, and adoption.
Just as the Senator Craigs of the world have fomented homophobia by
their self-abnegation and strident "pro-family" moralism, so the gay
rights movement attains its own normalcy by apologizing for its sex at
the cost of drawing a line between good gays and bad, virgins and
whores. As a result, the whores suffer-just ask them. Tune in a bit more
deeply, though, and see that the "boring" gays lose, too, if one believes
(as I do) that there is a subtle and longer term loss to be discerned in
discursive complicity with the denigration of homosexual sex.
2. Rights, Especially Equality
In answer to the dissenters' charge of judicial overstepping, Chief
Justice Marshall wrote in Goodridge:
wonder that so many gay men and lesbians feel either indifferent to or assaulted by
this campaign allegedly waged on their behalf,").
84. Mattilda, aka Matt Bernstein Sycamore, Breaking Glass: An Introduction, in THAT S
REVOLTING!, supra note 70, at 1, 3.
[Vol. 16:147172
The Massachusetts Constitution requires that legislation meet
certain criteria and not extend beyond certain limits. It is the
function of the courts to determine whether these criteria are
met and whether these limits are exceeded. . . . To label the
court's role as usurping that of the Legislature . . . is to misun-
derstand the nature and purpose of judicial review. We owe
great deference to the Legislature to decide social and policy is-
sues, but it is the traditional and settled role of courts to
decide constitutional issues.
Of course, the Chief Justice begs the question no less than her detrac-
tors. To determine whether a substantive issue is a constitutional one
and therefore a properly judicial one, a person must first form an opin-
ion on the substantive issue itself. Someone who does not view the
denial of marriage licenses to the plaintiffs as rising to the level of an
equality or due process concern will not, as a consequence, consider the
issue a judicial one, and vice versa. Chief Justice Marshall is no dope,
and it is difficult to imagine that this epistemological difficulty eludes
her. If that intuition is correct, then my complaint is about her bad faith
rather than her sophistication.
But my complaint is also about the position in which the gay rights
advocates have put her, where acquiescing to the same kind of obfusca-
tion promoted by the anti-gay right regarding the limits of judicial
competence seems like the best that she can do. In both legal and PR
venues, gay rights advocates-perhaps especially advocates of same-sex
marriage-routinely levy arguments that collaborate in the reproduction
of the framework that the anti-gay right is promoting when it condemns
"judicial activism." Even if the pro-gay cause is the nobler one, the asser-
tion that the constitutional terms render same-sex marriage a properly
85. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 966 (Mass. 2003). Similarly,
the California majority opinion states:
[W]e disagree with the Attorney General and the Governor to the extent
that they suggest that the traditional or longstanding nature of the current
statutory definition of marriage exempts the statutory provisions embodying
that definition from the constraints imposed by the California Constitution, or
that the separation-of-powers doctrine precludes a court from determining
that constitutional question. On the contrary, under "the constitutional
theory of 'checks and balances' that the separation of powers doctrine is in-
tended to serve" a court has an obligation to enforce the limitations that the
California Constitution imposes upon legislative measures, and a court
would shirk the responsibility it owes to each member of the public were it
to consider such statutory provisions to be insulated from judicial review.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 448 (Cal. 2008) (citations omitted).
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judicial question of rights, as opposed to a legislative question of values,
is just as lacking in foundation as the contrary claim. The critique set
forth in Part II.A supra is equally applicable, and I suppose too danger-
ous to deploy against anti-gay advocates for precisely that reason. 6
It might be that it is simply very, very hard not to speak in terms of
rights when talking about as emotional an issue as same-sex marriage
under conditions of a culture war. When an issue appears to be a basic
and obvious question of fairness, when one has felt personally demeaned
by the treatment one has received under the law, as well as by the pub-
lic's conversation about the life one leads, including the intimacies that
one feels gives her or his life meaning, the turn to rights is intuitive,
nearly impossible to forgo. I have experienced this and have complete
empathy for that pull.
Moreover, there is the hard, cold fact of the constitutional regime.
To prevail on a constitutional claim one obviously is bound to deal in
rights and justify counter-majoritarian action. My argument in this sec-
tion is not that gay rights advocates should make suicidal attempts to
bring constitutional claims without reference to rights or the reach of
judicial power. Instead, I am laying ground for a pitch (that will come in
the next part) to do something else-that is, to re-conceptualize the law
reform agenda to de-privilege questions of rights.
In addition to the collaborative elision of the epistemological prob-
lem, constructing an agenda around rights has disadvantages that have
gone under-recognized just as normalization does. Left-wing, critically-
minded legal thinkers have been trying to illuminate those disadvantages
for years," but somehow they seem easily forgotten in the context of
86. Cf Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change,
and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 2008-14 (2006). In a sec-
tion entitled "The Costs and Benefits of Candor," Goldberg perceives a tension
judges face between preserving institutional legitimacy and being explicit about their
choices among competing norms when they are being asked to advance a social pro-
gress agenda: "To the extent courts are concerned with legitimacy and capacity
constraints, a regime requiring discussion of norm choices might also lead to a de-
crease in decisions embracing societal change." Id. at 2012. "Simply put, norm
declaration closes doors more definitively than norm avoidance." Id. at 2013.
87. The Massachusetts tripartite system functions much like the federal system, in that
the judges are appointed and have (not life tenure but) tenure until the age of sev-
enty. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. IX and pt. 2, ch. 1II, art. I. One would
expect in this system, at least as much and probably more so than in a state in which
judges are elected, a good deal of attention paid to the balance between the judicial
and other branches of government in which the existence of rights justifies the exer-
tions of the counter-majoritarian branch.
88. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 315-38 (1997).
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identity-based legal reform. This section recalls some of the difficulties
as they manifest themselves in the relevant context.
a. Rights Claims Can Conflict and Even Invite Competing Rights Claims
Romer v. Evans concerned the constitutionality (under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution) of an amendment,
passed by statewide referendum, to the constitution of Colorado that
would have invalidated state and local laws providing anti-
discrimination protection to gay people." One of Colorado's arguments
in defense of the impugned "Amendment 2" was "respect for other citi-
zens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords
or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexual-
ity."0 Colorado's brief urged that the amendment
enhances individual freedom by eliminating governmental in-
terference in the choices people make in religious, familial,
personal, and associational matters.... Under the ordinances
preempted by Amendment 2, individual landlords or employ-
ers who have sincere and profound religious objections to
homosexuality would nonetheless be compelled to compro-
mise those convictions ... .9
Justice Kennedy and the rest of the six-member majority did not
buy it, but three dissenting justices (who expressed empathy for those
who wish to exclude gay people from teaching positions, tenancies,
etc.) 9 2 and plenty of Coloradans (who voted in the referendum to adopt
the amendment)9 did. Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller describes this as "per-
mitting dominant majority political interests to be viewed through a
minoritarian lens,"9 4 meaning, as I read him, that the gay people subject
to discrimination were the true minority while the anti-gay, religious
landlords were properly understood as belonging to a majority. It is not
clear, however, how one arrives at this certainty without first consulting
one's political preference. Religious landlords might constitute a small
minority of people, their religious and associational rights are at least
arguably implicated, so in what sense is this-in Goldberg-Hiller's
89. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996).
90. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
91. Brief for Petitioners at 43-44, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
92. See supra note 9.
93. See GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 39, at 50.
94. Id. at 63.
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terms-a "reversal"?" This designation implies a kind of certainty that
might be warranted by the particular dictates of one's conscience, but is
by no means rationally necessary. It contains a foundationless assump-
tion about who can occupy the position of victim and who cannot, but
surely if a religious landlord's prerogatives are intruded upon by anti-
discrimination measures, that landlord will feel victimized, just as a gay
tenant would under the contrary legal conditions.
Two rights or clusters of rights, such as the religious and associa-
tional rights of landlords and the equality rights of tenants, can conflict.
It might be that one right trounces the other under existing common
law, but it might be that both assertions are viable. When that happens,
it is either analytically unsound or in bad faith to dismiss one side's
rights as a distortion. Instead, one must confront the difficulty that it
might be bare political preference that makes the call, that one's judg-
ment might not be based on pure constitutional principle-in fact, the
same person might weigh the same two competing rights differently on
a different day. For example, imagine a religious man who is taken to a
public hospital emergency room and does not want to be touched by a
female doctor. A person who favored the equality right in the landlord-
tenant context might favor the religious and associational right in the
medical context. It does not seem to me "hypocritical" for a person to
reach opposite conclusions in those two cases. Instead, it is merely evi-
dence of what critical legal thinkers have been pointing out for years,
that is, that contextual factors and the weight one attributes to them due
to one's policy preferences matter in reaching legal conclusions.
The first problem with rights argumentation, then, is that contrary
outcomes often can be rendered correct within the logic of the dis-
course. What determines one's position on the just outcome as between
95. Id at 65.
96. See Libby Adler, Civil Unions and Civic Wars, 11 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 627 (2005)
(reviewing GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 39). To be clear, I do not foreclose the
possibility that one of the two competing rights will have a stronger pedigree under
our legal system, so that more case law can be marshaled behind it and it can ulti-
mately seem weightier. Sometimes that will be the case, but that still leaves times
when two highly valued rights conflict and their relative weight is not logically de-
terminable.
97. The Legal Realists are the critical progenitors on this point, having authored such
sentences as, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise."
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Writers asso-
ciated with Critical Legal Studies picked up the idea and, using the methodology of
internal critique, made multiple distinct efforts to expose the political preferences un-
derlying ostensibly rationally determinate legal conclusions. See, e.g., KENNEDY Supra
note 88, at 82-92.
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two conflicting rights might not be analytic correctness, but political
preference.' Rights, therefore, should be understood as unreliable. They
are not fundamental first principles that, properly considered, constrain
decision-makers to arrive at predictable and logically determined deci-
sions in every case. Decision-makers with different politics can (at least
sometimes) do different things with them. Some decision-makers might
do things that pro-gay advocates detest, but that cannot-rationally
speaking-be shown to be wrong.
Justice Scalia shows further the malleability of the discourse of ma-
jorities and minorities in his Romer dissent, not precisely on the point of
rights, but still in the general domain of attributing power and victim-
status. He describes Amendment 2, adopted by statewide referendum, as
an effort "to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
laws."99 He cites expert opinion to the effect that "those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in cer-
tain communities . . . [and] have high disposable income . . . .""oo He
chastises the majority for characterizing homosexuals as "politically un-
popular" (and therefore in need of counter-majoritarian protection) by
observing that the "group enjoys enormous influence in American me-
dia and politics, and which ... though composing no more than 4% of
the population had the support of 46% of voters on Amendment 2.""0
Justice Scalia describes the statewide referendum as "this most democ-
ratic of procedures" 102 used in this case "to counter both the geographic
concentration and the disproportionate political power of homosexu-
als."' Leaving aside for the moment the specious factual assertions
about gay demographics, observe how the alleged minority achieves
through geographic concentration and wealth a position that removes it
from the counter-majoritarian purview. It turns out that power and
powerlessness can be shifted around a bit more than the formulation:
98. See KENNEDY, supra note 88, at 316-17.
99. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Romer, 517 U.S. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Romer, 517 U.S. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This comes up in the California mar-
riage case, as well. One of the dissents disputes the finding of a suspect class and the
application of strict scrutiny in part because "the gay and lesbian community does
not lack political power." In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 466 (Cal. 2008)
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority does not appear to disagree
about the group's political power, but was satisfied that the class "exhibit[s] a certain
characteristic [that] historically has been subjected to invidious and prejudicial treat-
ment." Id. at 443. See also Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 487-
88 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J. dissenting) (on political powerless).
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gay = victim of majoritarian discrimination, anti-gay = majoritarian
would allow.
If these were the only hazards in rights discourse, one might con-
clude that the best plan is to proceed with the gay rights agenda and
hope for decision-makers who share pro-gay politics. Sometimes this
works-as it did in Romer. Sometimes it does not, as in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bostono0 and Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale1 -both cases in which a statutorily granted right
against discrimination had to give way to an expressive or associational
right under the First Amendment. This, however, is not the full extent
of the danger.
It might actually be the case that a discourse of gay rights invites
conflicting rights claims. In Massachusetts, for example, after the
Goodridge decision, advocates of a state constitutional amendment that
would ban same-sex marriage were thwarted by a legislature that repeat-
edly tabled their proposed amendment, eventually voting it down, so that
it never made it to the ballot for a statewide referendum.1 o6 They and
then-Governor Mitt Romney urged that "the people" had a "right to vote"
on the amendment.107 Aghast at the flipping of the rights
rhetoric, pro-gay advocates protested that it was basic American civics that
"rights" arguments were the province of the minority seeking equality."'8
104. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that application of the Massachusetts public accommodation statute to re-
quire the organizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade to include a gay and lesbian group
violated the First Amendment rights of the organizers).
105. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that application of the
New Jersey public accommodations statute to require the Boy Scouts to retain an
'out" gay scoutmaster violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive
association).
106. The Legislature went into recess without voting in November, 2006, postponed the
vote in May, 2007, and eventually voted down the proposed amendment in June,
2007. See Associated Press, A Timeline ofEvents Involving Gay Marriage in Massachu-
setts, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/
local/massachusetts/articles/2006/03/30/a timeline of events involving-gay-marriage
in massachusetts/; see also MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, ch. IV, §§ 4-5 (requiring the
legislature to meet in a joint session and vote 1/4 favorably on a petition by a certain
date in order for the petition to be put on the next statewide ballot).
107. See Katie Zezima, Massachusetts Governor Sues to Compel Vote on Same-Sex Marriage
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/11/25/us/25marriage.html?_r=1 &scp=1 &sq-sues%20for%20vote%20on%20s
ame-sex%20marriage%20amendment&st-cse; see also Largess v. Supreme Judicial
Court of Mass., 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1002 (2004)
(rejecting effort to invalidate Goodridge as a violation of the Guaranty Clause of the
United States Constitution).
108. See David Weber, Romney Wants Gay-Marriage Ban on Mass. Ballot, WASH. POST,
Nov. 20, 2006, at A6.
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That the anti-gay activists could turn their cause into one of rights
seemed, for a moment, stunning.
In hindsight, however, perhaps it should not have been. Pro-same-
sex marriage advocates began a rights-based campaign, prompting op-
ponents to dismiss the existence of the right. Once the right was
vindicated by the state's highest court, however, this could no longer
serve the anti-same-sex marriage cause effectively; the ship had sailed:
same-sex marriage was a right in Massachusetts. To ratchet up the anti-
same-sex marriage campaign and meet the next procedural challenge
(i.e., the amendment process), anti-same-sex marriage activists had to
identify a victimizing deprivation like the one suffered by Colorado's
religious landlords. A competing right had to be generated. Voting must
have seemed like a pretty good one.0 9
If this is a fair rendition, then rights claims can provoke rights
claims, stoking the culture war rather than bringing it to a right-
determined conclusion. The culture war's supple discourse around
themes of victimization and majoritarianism/counter-majoritarianism
make this possible, perhaps inevitable.
b. Rights Imply Rights-Bearers
In an equal protection case or a claim that involves the rights of
some group, the judgment is only one of perhaps many consequences.
As a separate matter, the very assertion of the group's existence, and the
terms used to define or depict that group, can have potent effects. Liti-
gators "represent" their clients in more than just the usual sense of the
lawyerly duty to zealously advocate on their behalf.o So, for example,
when a gay rights litigator "represents" gays and lesbians in some civil
rights action, the claim implies a more or less coherent and identifiable
group on whose behalf the claim is made. It would be a mistake,
however, to imagine that the litigator simply observes that pre-existing
group, can discern its rough boundaries and can ascertain its interests.
Instead, this subsection argues, the litigator-consciously or not-is
participating in the ongoing production of that group.
This does not make everything that the litigator does on behalf of
the group inherently wrong, but it does suggest that the litigator ought
109. See also the California marriage case, in which the dissent refers to "the People's gen-
eral right, directly or through their chosen legislators, to decide fundamental issues of
public policy for themselves." In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 459 (Cal. 2008)
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Iglesias supra note 62 (discussing racial and gendered representations in law,
especially rape law); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2007).
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to feel obligated to deliberate on the consequences of that facet of repre-
sentation. "[R]epresentation is very different from reflection: 'It implies
the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping:
not merely the transmitting of already-existing meaning, but the more
active labour of making things mean."'" So, when a lawyer articulates a
client-constituency and asserts claims on its behalf, that articulation is
not merely a passive description of the group as it is found in the natural
world; instead the lawyer is an active participant in making that con-
stituency real and giving it meaning and therefore should, in my view,
take responsibility for that act.
At least two relevant potential consequences to gay rights litigation
should be considered. First, as one of the more oft-cited thinkers in this
area, political scientist Wendy Brown, has cogently argued, it is worth
contemplating
whether legal "protection" for a certain injury-forming identity
discursively entrenches the injury-identity connection it de-
nounces. Might such protection codify within the law the very
powerlessness it aims to redress? Might it discursively collude
with the conversion of attribute into identity, of a historical ef-
fect of power into a presumed cause of victimization?1 12
In other words, when a lawyer brings the unfairly treated class of gays
and lesbians to court to seek redress, or petitions a legislative body to
enact protective legislation, it is not merely the acquisition of a judg-
ment or piece of legislation to which the lawyer ought to attend. A
judgment or law that seems favorable might have the long term cost of
re-inscribing injury on the class. There is a cost-benefit analysis to be
performed between the value of the judicial relief or protective legisla-
tion sought and the protraction of the group's subordinate status as a
political reality. It is as an injured subordinate that one approaches the
law seeking protection or vindication. Where Brown mentions turning a
"historical effect of power into a presumed cause of victimization,""' I
take her to mean that an identity group associated with injury and sub-
ordination such as gays and lesbians is not a natural grouping that
would exist under any historical conditions. Various forces converged to
produce an identity group around a particular (if variable) set of
111. Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS / CULTURAL Ac-
TIVISM 197, 203 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988) (citations omitted).
112. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 21
(1995).
113. Id.
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behaviors, traits, or tendencies. It is worth considering whether a better
strategy in the long term, if what one wants is to ameliorate the injury, is
to highlight the historical contingency of the grouping," to call into
question the coherence of the grouping or the moral relevance of the
traits said to render the group coherent, rather than to re-enforce the
apparent naturalness of the group by bringing it before the law for
remedies, which seems like a good recipe for prolonging the existence of
the injured class. This may be an under-recognized cost associated with
rights argumentation: when the advocate articulates the claimant group
and the injury it suffers as a class, the advocate simultaneously discur-
sively reproduces the group as a subordinate.
The second consideration has less to do with injury but nonetheless
regards the production of identity and the establishment of governing
norms. In a Foreword to the Supreme Court Review of the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology published the year after Lawrence, Ber-
nard Harcourt wrote surprisingly that it is "far too simplistic today to
think about a decision such as Lawrence in dichotomous terms-as ei-
ther 'good' or 'bad' for 'homosexuals.'"" The sentence is surprising
because it takes a consciously critical effort to imagine that there might
be constituencies, vaguely pro-homosexual if we divide the world in
two, for whom that case might be a defeat. Taking as his starting point
Justice Scalia's dissent which asserts that the Lawrence majority sided
with homosexuals,1 1 6 Harcourt sets out to undermine this dichotomous
view of the culture war, in which there is a pro-gay side and an anti-gay
side. 
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Harcourt depicts instead a disorderly array of small groups with
wildly divergent sexual projects (e.g., "promiscuity, monogamy, child
custody, sadomasochism, commitment, 'fisting,' public sex, female-to-
male sex change operations (and male-to-female), 'barebacking' and
'bug chasing,' importuning, 'role-playing,' 'piercing' and 'cutting,' 'pack-
ing,' 'fancying,' marrying, childbearing, adopting, pornography, and
sexual assault-to name just a few"1 ) and identities (e.g., heterosexual,
114. See JOHN D'EMILIO, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON
GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY 3 (1992) (on the progress of American
capitalism from the colonial period through industrialization and how that progres-
sion contributed to the emergence of gay identity).
115. Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword to "You are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone":
On the Radical Dissents ofJustice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers. [Raising Questions
About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
503, 511 (2004).
116. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Harcourt, supra note 115, at 506-07.
118. Id. at 507.
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homosexual, bi-, trans-, poly-, metro-, pomo-sexual, lesbian, queer-
again, to name just a few"'). He urges that before we can know "[w]ho
wins and who loses," as a result of a case such as Lawrence, we would
have to engage in "a much closer parsing of sexual projects" than Justice
Scalia's dichotomous portrayal of the culture war permits. 120 Harcourt's
key examples of those who might experience Lawrence as a defeat are
constituencies who thrive on transgression, for whom constitutional
protection for their sex acts might be anathema. 121
One could take the position that these variables and (in many
cases) outlying constituencies do not much matter. This should be rec-
ognized as a political choice, though, for which a person designing a law
reform agenda ought to take responsibility. Mere assertion of the "pro-
gay position" or of the interests of the gay community, without the
"parsing" that Harcourt calls for, steamrolls over the concerns of real
people. Moreover, the practice of asserting the singular pro-gay position
is a powerful discursive act. That is, the articulation of the group and its
interests is group-making, not merely group-describing. Of course, one
must speak, describe, and make-the argument is not that one can
avoid that, but is (in part) a defense of explicit deliberation. To con-
sciously deliberate on the varied projects, identities and interests, and to
state forthrightly what factors are deemed most weighty and which must
give way to them, even if in the end the judgment call is to seek consti-
tutional protection for sodomy (which I favor), is a more honest act
than to articulate competing interests out of view.1 22
Rights imply a rights-bearing constituency with an identity
bounded by traits and/or norms. Production of this constituency by
119. Id. at 507.
120. Id. at 511. I also have portrayed the culture war as dichotomous in this Article, but I
hope it will not be read in quite the same way. Part of my argument is that many
costs and benefits have been excluded from strategic calculation precisely because of
the discourse of the culture war, one facet of which is its polarity. Like Harcourt, I
am advocating a deliberate step outside of that discourse in order to see what the dis-
course obscures.
121. Id. at 525-37.
122. This takes us back to the discussion in Part IJ.B.1 supra regarding normalization-in
particular, the idea that the sex-family distinction is a trans-political trope that pro-
duces the experience of sex and family as incompatible. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text (citing Foucault for the concept of production). Here, the idea is
that the legal representation of the rights-seeking gay constituency, let's say as a con-
stituency for whom access to marriage amounts to fair legal treatment, could produce
that constituency in multiple ways. For example, it could organize the constituency
around a good gay/bad gay polarity and entrench the perception gay identity is natu-
rally occurring rather than historically contingent, which, as other writers have
argued, see, e.g., D'EMILIo, supra note 114, is both historically flawed and associated
with certain perils.
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making rights claims comes with costs. In the case of "entrench[ing] the
injury-identity connection, it might sometimes be worth the cost to
seek judicial or legislative redress. I do not foreclose that possibility.
Moreover, the discursive production of a particular rights-bearing con-
stituency that elides people who get in the way might be mitigated
against through conscious consideration of a broad range of projects,
identities and interests. Still, I hope it will become clear in Part III that
there are other kinds of law reform besides rights claims that are less
likely to subject individuals to these hazards.
c. Discourse Can Produce Desire and Curb Imagination
Finally, and most importantly, it is worth considering whether
some of the specific desires embodied in the gay rights agenda, however
passionately and authentically held, are a product of the equality dis-
course in which gay-identified people are caught. Same-sex marriage, for
example, does not have to be a reformist priority, and has not always
been one.124 In recent years, however, it has come to feel like the brass
ring.1 25 This might be because the discourse of equality produces it as
such.
Marriage is the right that the anti-gay camp seems most to want to
hoard, 1 26 the mark of heterosexual distinction and superiority, which
seems only to heighten the gay need for it. This is not to deny that there
are important legal benefits that accompany marriage, but we are past
the point at which gay rights advocates would be satisfied with even a
federally recognized version of civil unions identical to marriage in all
respects except name. This became abundantly evident when, in August
2007, several of the Democratic candidates for President appeared in an
unprecedented televised forum focused solely on gay issues.' 27 The three
123. BROWN, supra note 112.
124. See WARNER, supra note 63, at 84, 87 (regarding the shift in law reform and activist
priorities to marriage); id. at 109 (noting that "the desire to marry is an aspect of the
normativity of marriage").
125. See Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361 (2005) (begin-
ning: "[flor some time, the right to marry has defined homosexuality's horizon.
Once, very recently, a political and legal impossibility, officially a reductio ad absur-
dum, marriage has become the lesbian and gay communities' main programmatic
obsession.").
126. Cf GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 39, at 7 ("[T]he growing tolerance for diverse
living arrangements makes the public rejection of same-sex marriage seem all the
more a significant limit in need of explanation and comprehension.")
127. See 2008 Gay Rights Forum (LOGO television broadcast Aug. 7, 2007) (transcript on
file with the Michigan Journal of Gender and Law).
2009] THE GAY AGENDA 183
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
frontrunners, Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), Senator Hillary Clinton
(D-NY), and former Senator John Edwards (D-NC), in seriatim, indi-
cated their support for identical legal benefits for same-sex couples, even
at the federal level, but under the separate name "civil union" rather
than "marriage." 128 The panelists, including the president of the Human
Rights Campaign (HRC) (the leading gay rights lobbying organization
that convened the forum), expressed dissatisfaction with the position of
each.129 The issue of same-sex marriage exceeds its dimension of concrete
legal benefits. Gay rights advocates will not feel satisfied that they have
been victorious until all discernable signs of formal inequality are ex-
punged. Once the war is on, one must win it.
This might be a good reason not to wage war, but if not, there are
others. First, the war continues to require the commitment of tremen-
dous resources that might have gone elsewhere (the next part will offer
alternative sites). Second, the need for equality at the level of symbolism,
not merely at the level of concrete benefits, accords more power to the
state to provide one's sense of self-worth than perhaps is healthy. Fi-
nally-my main point here-it would be good to have the mental room
to deliberate on whether this is the best place to devote so much law
reform effort, but psychological room to critically evaluate law reform
priorities is pretty difficult to come by when marriage is so tied up in the
discourse of equality. Operating within the discourse, one almost cannot
help but to ask: Am I truly being treated as equal if my intimate partner-
ship is managed under the separate legal category of "civil union'? It is
much harder to generate such questions as: Is the denial ofaccess to mar-
riage the cause of so much suffering in the domain of sexuality compared
with other causes that it should ascend to the top of the reform agenda? Is
some of the suffering that it does cause a result of my having yielded to the
state too much power to bestow legitimacy and value on my ife, so that I
could mitigate against that suffering by thinking in a new way? What other
possibilities for change fall outside of my line of vision while I chase this
prize? And finally, Might the battle for marriage rights for same-sex couples
impose any costs on GLBT or other marginalized people?
In the forum on gay issues for Democratic presidential candidates,
lesbian pop musician Melissa Etheridge (inexplicably one of the panel-
ists) began the questioning of John Edwards."'o After observing that both
she and Edwards's wife had suffered from cancer, Etheridge recalled the
high cost of her treatment and inquired, "[D]o you understand the spe-
cial needs of people in gay and lesbian couples who cannot depend on
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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their partner's insurance for protection because they are not a legal
spouse or have to pay extra on the benefit? What would you do about
this?"'"' Edwards used the opportunity to tout his health care plan, then,
in an apparent non sequitur, said:
And I might add just a few weeks ago I was the [sic] LA Gay
and Lesbian Center, which is an extraordinary place, which
I'm sure some people here are familiar with here in the Los
Angeles community, where they are doing amazing, amazing
work.
But there's a message from my visit there that I think is really
important for America to hear, which is I met a whole group
of young people who were there because they were homeless,
and they were homeless because they came out of the closet
and told their parents the truth, and their parents kicked them
out of the home.
And there they were-the only place-they were living on the
street, had nowhere to go. Thank God for the LA Gay and
Lesbian Center being there for them, and an extraordinary
woman who runs the center. But without that place, where
would these young people go?
And it just can't be that in America people think that's OK.
They can't believe that's OK. And they need to hear and see
exactly what I saw when I was there, because it was moving. It
was touching, and I actually believe that that kind of experi-
ence would have a huge impact on the American people if they
Id . 132could just see.
The panelists were not so moved. Etheridge responded by asking
Edwards whether he was "uncomfortable around gay people""' and
eventually the panelist from HRC brought the brief discussion back to
Edwards's inadequate position on marriage.' Apparently, it did not
occur to any of them to ask some sort of follow-up question, such as,
What would you do as president to help those kids that you met at the LA
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Gay and Lesbian Center?" Would the panelists contend that access to
marriage was a more pressing injustice or are they just unable to see
anything outside of marriage's glare?"'
Same-sex marriage seems to have captured the imagination of
numerous people concerned with sexuality. In addition to this popular
display by HRC's panel, the canon of books and articles is virtually end-
less; a number of well-known scholars have written extensively on the
topic.13 It is not merely volume, however, that conveys the point about
dominating the imagination. If one were to compare readings advocat-
ing same-sex marriage to, say, readings advocating that gay people be
permitted to adopt children,"' the arguments convey a different feeling
135. Perhaps a pop star cannot be expected to follow up appropriately, but the other two
panelists were a journalist and the chief of a major gay rights organization. Also, it is
worth noting that neither did it seem to occur to Etheridge that even people who are
not in same-sex relationships sometimes face difficulty paying for expensive medical
treatments. Same-sex marriage would hardly fix the problem of access to affordable
medical care. I am not the first person to observe this, see, e.g., Beyondmarriage.org,
http://www.beyondmarriage.org/full-statement.html, the web page for a group of
left, GLBT and queer activists, academics, artists and others who convened initially in
2006 to think about change "beyond" same-sex marriage, but I mention it nonethe-
less because it bolsters the point about the power of the equality discourse to curb
imagination.
136. This glare seems to blind marriage proponents to other pressing issues as well as to
the downsides of marriage itself. For example, one often sees the well-known advan-
tages of marriage in the immigration context cited in support of the need for equal
access for same-sex couples. See, e.g., Evan Wolfson, Why We Should Fight for the
Freedom to Marry, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 128, 129 (Andrew
Sullivan ed., 1997). Somehow, though, those proponents have not noticed that
reformers in the domain of domestic violence have had to struggle with the bind in
which the marital immigration advantage leaves battered women immigrants who
face a disincentive to leave their citizen husbands. See generally Janet Calvo, A Decade
of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's Diminishment, But Not Its Demise, 24
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153 (2004). Shouldn't the pros and cons of marriage in the immi-
gration context at least be fully evaluated before putting gay immigrant victims of
domestic violence in this same position?
137. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY
MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? WHAT WE VE LEARNED FROM THE
EVIDENCE (2006); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate: A Step-By-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGEORGE
L. REV. 641 (2000) [hereinafter Eskridge, Comparative Law]; William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The Ideological Structure of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate (And Some Postmodern
Arguments for Same-Sex Marriage), in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNER-
SHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (Robert
Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001).
138. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners But Not Parents/Recognizing Parents
But Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17
186 [Vol. 16:147
about their purpose. Readings in the former, unlike the latter, often con-
tain an implicit-sometimes explicit-suggestion that to prevail on
same-sex marriage is to prevail finally.
Take, for example, the work of leading academic proponent of
same-sex marriage, William Eskridge. Eskridge has argued that "legal
recognition of same-sex unions-or, ultimately, marriages-comes
through a step-by-step process. Such a process is sequential and incre-
mental: it proceeds by little steps that are taken in a particular order."
According to Eskridge, the countries that have partner recognition laws
that come close to marriage"'
first decriminalized consensual sodomy and equalized the age
of consent for homosexual and heterosexual intercourse, then
... adopted laws prohibiting employment and other kinds of
discrimination against gay people, and finally ... provided
other kinds of more limited state recognition for same-sex rela-
tionships, such as the giving of legal benefits to or the
enforcing of legal obligations on cohabiting same-sex cou-
ples.'4 '
Eskridge borrows at least some of his observations from Kees
Waaldijk of the University of Leiden, a Dutch legal scholar and same-sex
marriage proponent, internationally known in the debate. 14 2 In Small
Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Nether-
lands, Waaldijk lays out the three phases (cited by Eskridge) based on his
observations of the legal treatment of homosexuality and the steps ante-
cedent to formal partner recognition in Europe, then proceeds to
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 711, 713-14 (2000) (disclaiming that joint adoption
would serve as a final step in a predictable sequence in the United States).
139. Eskridge, Comparative Law, supra note 137, at 647-48 (citation omitted).
140. One could charge Eskridge with being a bit sloppy here, nearly equating same-sex
marriage with other forms of partner recognition, but elsewhere in the article
Eskridge is attentive to the distinctions among partnership recognition laws, noting
some variations and referring to the range as a "menu." See id. at 661-62. In the epi-
logue of their 2006 book evaluating the Scandinavian reforms, Eskridge and Spedale
set forth a typology of partnership recognition laws in ascending order of the "unitive
commitment expected or entailed in the partners' relationship," ESKRIDGE & SPED-
ALE, supra note 137, at 252, and regard the menu of options involving varying levels
of commitment and concomitant legal benefits as a list of competitors that might
weaken the appeal of marriage, id. at 256. They make the interesting observation that
the options on the menu may emerge as political compromises, partially accommo-
dating pro and anti-gay rights forces struggling over whether same-sex couples will
be admitted into the institution. Id.
141. Eskridge, Comparative Law, supra note 137, at 648.
142. See id. at 648 n.32 (citing Waaldijk, infra, but before publication of the paper).
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describe in detail the history that concluded in the legalization of same-
sex marriage in the Netherlands, which was the first jurisdiction in the
world to take the leap.'4 ' His claims are not modest:
If you look at the legislative history of the recognition of ho-
mosexuality in European countries, it seems that this process is
governed by certain trends, that can tentatively be formulated
as if they were "laws of nature". At the very least, there is a
clear pattern of steady progress according to standard se-
144quences.
Waaldijk goes on to specify sub-steps-the components of each of the
three major phases-and to deem the overall process demonstrative of
his "law of small change," 14 ' a theory which appears to have won over
Eskridge.1 4 6
It may be that Waaldijk and Eskridge have the history right, and
one might even give Waaldijk the benefit of the doubt in his assertion
that the history amounts to something of a pattern-that is, it might be
true that same-sex marriage is so shocking, as compared with, say, de-
criminalizing sodomy, that it can come into being only after the general
population of a society is gradually introduced to pro-gay law reforms
and a certain sense of fairness toward gay people is cultivated. Taking the
teleological approach, however, obscures law reform possibilities deemed
non-essential in the march toward the telos' -for example, finding
ways to house kids who have been kicked out of the house by their par-
ents after expressing something about their emerging identities or
desires.
Eskridge urges repeatedly in his work that same-sex marriage is
demanded by the principle of formal equality, even charging that "nei-
ther progressives nor conservatives [opposed to same-sex marriage] have
yet produced a convincing response to my argument that the principle
of formal equality requires the state to recognize same-sex unions on the
143. Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPs: A STUDY OF NA-
TIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 439-40, 441-53 (Robert
Wintemute & Mads Andenes eds., 2001).
144. Id. at 4 39.
145. Id. at 4 4 0.
146. See Eskridge, Comparative Law, supra note 137, at 647-48.
147. See Ariela R. Dubler, Essay, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual
Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1165 (2006); Katherine M.
Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2685 (2008) (discussing other
shortcomings associated with the teleological approach).
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same terms as which it recognizes different-sex unions."' It seems to
me that there is a basic epistemological difficulty that more or less
equally plagues pro- and anti-same-sex marriage arguments (i.e., only
political preference tells one whether formal equality requires the law to
do more than permit all persons of any sex or sexual orientation to enter
into a heterosexual marriage).'"9 I will explain how his challenge can be
met here, then proceed to what I see as the real issue.
In his 1996 book, Eskridge devotes a chapter to arguing that pro-
hibitions against same-sex marriage should be found unconstitutional
based on Loving v. Virginia,5 o the case in which the United States Su-
preme Court struck down a state law prohibiting interracial marriage.
As Eskridge explains, the usual argument against extending Loving to
strike down prohibitions against same-sex marriage is that in Loving, the
statutory classification was race, and the ideology animating the statute
(Chief Justice Warren found) was white supremacy, effectively creating a
"caste system" that disadvantaged non-white people. 152 In the case of
same-sex marriage, however, the statutory classification is sex, while the
ideology is heterosexism (rather than sexism) and the disadvantaged class
is homosexuals (rather than women)."' The argument against the appli-
cability of Loving is based on this discontinuity between the
classification and its animating ideology and resulting hierarchy.1 54
Eskridge sets out to undermine that distinction in two alternative ways.
First, he cites Sylvia Law and Andrew Koppelman for the argument
that heterosexism is, at its core, a manifestation of sexism and that
women, confined historically to a disadvantageous marital role, are in
fact a disadvantaged class as a result of the heterosexual-only definition
of marriage.'5 ' There is, therefore, greater continuity than appears at first
blush and the Loving analogy holds. 1 6
But then Eskridge laments that this argument has something of a
"transvestite quality," "dress[ing] a gay rights issue up in gender rights
garb," and moves on to his second version of the Loving analogy in
which sexual orientation is the classification, an argument he views as
148. See Eskridge, Comparative Law, supra note 137, at 641-42.
149. See supra Part IIA.
150. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
151. ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 137, at 153-82.
152. Id. at 165.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 165-67.
155. Id at 162 (citing Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 187 (1988); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994)).
156. ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 137, at 171.
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"more direct.",1  In the second argument, Eskridge taps Washington v.
Davis'5 ' and Yick Wo v. Hopkins5 for the idea that a facially neutral stat-
ute's heavily "lopsided effect[s]" are constitutionally relevant, and that
this is particularly pertinent in the same-sex marriage context where the
prohibition "is animated in large part by the state's insistence on com-
pulsory heterosexuality."'6 0 This argument justifies his using sexual
orientation as the classification, despite a marriage statute's typical facial
neutrality as to that category. Then, if we are all in agreement that het-
erosexism is behind the law and homosexuals are the disadvantaged
class, we have continuity and (assuming we apply a heightened form of
scrutiny, an argument he also makes but which I will not recount
here 16 1 ) the Loving analogy holds. 162
One has to admire Eskridge's nimbleness with the categories of sex
and sexual orientation, sexism and heterosexism, women and homo-
sexuals. The complex and highly debatable connections among those
categories give him a lot with which to work. He is less nimble with the
components of Loving, however, and this is why his formal equality ar-
guments are not as determinate as he thinks. Chief Justice Warren made
choices regarding classification, ideology, and disadvantaged group that
Eskridge did not appear to notice were choices.
The State defended itself in Loving by denying any racial hierarchy
in the impugned statute,13 and in fact an earlier Supreme Court ac-
cepted that reasoning in Pace v. Alabama,64 as Eskridge notes.16 The
State was forthright about its eugenic ideology,1 66 but did not go so far as
to admit to an ideology of white supremacy. Of course, Chief Justice
Warren was having none of it. In the Chief Justice's view, the eugenic
purpose of the statute "boiled down to 'White supremacy, " just as in
the Law/Koppelman view, heterosexism "boils down to" sexism. The
former might seem obvious, but it was not obvious to the Pace Court,
157. Id at 172.
158. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
159. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
160. ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 137, at 172-73.
161. Id at 176-81.
162. Id at 181.
163. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
164. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding an anti-miscegenation law be-
cause it applied to all races). Pace was overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964).
165. ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 137, at 156.
166. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
167. ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 137, at 160. See also Loving,
388 U.S. at 7, 11.
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which made a different political choice. Likewise, not everyone adheres
to the Law/Koppelman view.
Eskridge may be correct to read Chief Justice Warren's opinion as
finding a "caste system" in which non-white people were the disadvan-
taged class, but if this reading is correct the finding was not necessary.
Mildred and Richard Loving were equally subject to penalty under the
Virginia law,"' so it was not just black people who suffered. As Eskridge
acknowledges, another articulation of the disadvantaged group might
have been "people who fall in love with a person of another race." 1 70 We
could call these people something-let's say "different-race-o-sexuals"-
but we don't. We refrain from labeling them as such, even though we
might observe in the world around us that some people have a fairly
consistent tendency toward cross-racial desire, perhaps as consistent as
the correlation between same-sex desire and gay identity. Again, there
are unseen decisions being made. Had Chief Justice Warren, relying on
Yick Wo (Washington v. Davis had not yet been decided), found that a
group called "different-race-o-sexuals" was unfairly disadvantaged by the
statute, and that they constituted a real group, perhaps immutably so,
for equal protection purposes, then the argument usually offered against
the Loving analogy would collapse, saving Eskridge nearly thirty pages.
Loving hinged on a judicial willingness to move analytically from a
race-based classification to a particular ideology and a racial hierarchy.
Chief Justice Warren made good choices in Loving, but that does not
mean that they were required as a matter of formal logic. When we go to
the grocery store and see apples in one bin and oranges in another, we
do not suspect the grocer of having an apple-supremacist ideology, yet
white supremacy seems like a pretty reasonable suspicion when we read
Virginia's statute. Formal logic does not tell us the difference; experience
does. 171
This is the answer to Eskridge's challenge. Same-sex marriage is not
logically required by the principle of formal equality any more than
Loving was. To get to his decision in Loving, Chief Justice Warren made
the political choice to reject the distinction between a eugenic ideology
and white supremacy and to see the creation of a racial hierarchy rather
168. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Arguments for Lesbian and
Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REv. 471 (2001). But see Andrew Koppelman, Defending the
Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49
UCLA L. REv. 519 (2001).
169. Loving, 338 U.S. at 3.
170. ESKRIDGE, CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 137, at 166.
171. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Early Forms of Liability, in THE COMMON Law 1, 1
(1881), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 9, 9 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds.,
1993) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
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than harm to a discrete class of people who exhibit cross-racial desire. To
get to same-sex marriage using a constitutional equality provision, one
must make similar choices, but one could refuse. One could begin with
sex as the classification, but then find that heterosexism does not "boil
down to" sexism, or, alternatively, one could begin with sexual orienta-
tion as the classification, then find that heterosexism is at base sexism
but that women are not disadvantaged. Of course, one also could find as
Eskridge wishes; it's just that one need not.
My larger argument, however, is that Eskridge's framing of the chal-
lenge is problematic. Formal equality has its merits, but it is not
incontrovertible that formal equality is the highest value that law re-
formers could be pursuing at all times. For one thing, the very term
formal equality exists in opposition to substantive equality,1 2 and -as any
student of affirmative action or workplace accommodations for working
mothers will attest-these goals can conflict. A formal equality agenda
can eclipse or even undermine other potentially worthy goals. For ex-
ample, the achievement of formal equality has been held responsible by
some for obscuring subtle forms of racism that would be better ad-
dressed using a more remedial approach, or that fly beneath the radar of
anti-discrimination discourse thereby debilitating anti-racist political
action.1  In the case of workplace accommodations for working moth-
ers, feminists with divergent interests (i.e., those mothers seeking
accommodation for their family lives " and those non-mothers who
could find themselves either discriminated against because they are seen
as potential mothers or bearing the brunt of the work from which the
accommodated mothers obtained relief' ) have found that they do not
172. See, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate, 16
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 145, 190 (2004) ("Substantive equality, as opposed to formal
equality, should be the self-conscious goal of feminist reform in the Islamic world.");
Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Ap-
praisal, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1687-89 (1986) (drawing the distinction and
advocating for the latter).
173. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation inAntidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1348 (1998).
174. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Our Economy of Mothers and Others: Women and Economics
Revisited, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 411, 422-27 (2002) (urging workplace restruc-
turing to accommodate women's work patterns).
175. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Commentary, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling
Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be
Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1753, 1758-59 (2001) ("I fear the practical effect of
localizing benefits for children and their parents at the level of the employer may be
to effect something like a taking, not so much from the employer, as principally from
one group of female employees (childless women who will remain childless), for the
benefit predominantly of another group of male employees (those with wives and
children). The former are in a lose/lose scenario, the latter can win big, while childless
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form a singular constituency for whom formal or substantive equality is
a clear and uncontroversial goal.
In the case of gay people, the benefits of formal equality stand
counterpoised to the costs associated with the pursuit of formal equality.
While the attainment of formal equality has undeniable fairness appeal,
the pursuit takes place in the context of a culture war which is waged in
normalization and rights discourses, some costs of which are described
in this part.
Eskridge anticipates one difficulty with the culture war in his dis-
cussion of fundamentalist religion. He acknowledges that
the trajectory of religious enthusiasm. . . . might be influenced
by gay people's efforts to secure equal rights. As gay rights and
openly gay people have become part of the public culture,
fundamentalist religions in the United States have not only
been energized in their efforts to confront that development,
but have reordered their religious beliefs to make homophobia
doctrinally central. Thus, it is quite possible that recognition
of same-sex marriages in one or a few jurisdictions could mas-
sively reenergize religious fundamentalism and trigger a
national or transnational backlash against gay rights.1 71
Eskridge understands that advocacy of same-sex marriage is an engage-
ment in the culture war and that this is an invitation to opponents to
fight back and sometimes win. He underestimates the costs of engage-
ment, however, because he is fixated only on the telos of
marriage/formal equality: you win some, you lose some. The argument
here, however, is that the costs are being inflicted now, in the pursuit.
Sex is being segregated from family, vulnerable people are being left be-
hind and alienated, alliances are being undermined, and the imagination
necessary to fully develop law reform possibilities unrelated to the march
toward marriage/formal equality is being curbed.'
The same-sex marriage campaign is the easiest target for this cri-
tique. Marriage, however, is not the only item on the gay law reform
men may lose little and employee-mothers win some. . . . All women may be at in-
creased risk for employment discrimination. . . . Permanently childless women like
me will be in a lose/lose situation-so long as we are potentially mothers, we are at
risk for discrimination; so long as we are not actually mothers, we get no offsetting
compensation from the increased childcare benefits.").
176. Eskridge, Comparative Law, supra note 137, at 657.
177. See WARNER, supra note 63, at 84 ("Since the 1993 March on Washington, marriage
has come to dominate the political imagination of the national gay movement in the
United States.").
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agenda the desire for which might be the product of a discourse that is
difficult to see and the pursuit of which might in turn reproduce the
discursive conditions that curb imagination. A former student in my
course on Sexuality, Gender and the Law raised the possibility that the
debate over adding sexual orientation as a category of offense to hate
crime statutes contributes to anti-gay violence.1 7 Real causation would
be tough to demonstrate as an empirical matter and he made no pre-
tense of doing so; instead, he argued that as the debate about hate
crimes wears on, pro- and anti-gay advocates participate in a discourse
that not only entrenches an injured gay identity, but inflicts and re-
inflicts the question of homosexuality's moral worth. His point was not
that hate crime protection was itself harmful, but that there are unno-
ticed costs being inflicted along the way to that law reform goal.
I add to his argument only the possibility that a confluence of in-
terrelated discourses of equality, injury and minority status produce the
gay desire for that specific law reform. This is not to deny the travesty of
anti-gay violence for both bodies and minds, but rather to call into
question how one comes to desire the particular solution of hate crimes
legislation. All of the legitimate and worthy minorities seem to be cov-
ered by hate crimes legislation; to be recognized as a worthy minority,
it therefore seems to follow, one must have it. Possibilities for addressing
the problem of physical safety besides a public law prohibition that tar-
gets animosity toward gay identity might occur to reformers under
different discursive conditions,80 but right now such possibilities are
difficult to imagine. Imagining them requires a deliberate effort to step
outside of the culture war discourses of equality and minority status.
In another example, pro-gay lobbyists have been urging Congress
for years to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). 1
ENDA would provide anti-discrimination coverage in the employment
context much like Title VII does for other groups. 18 2 Early versions of
the bill protected against discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
178. The former student is Carl Roller, Northeastern University School of Law, class of
2005.
179. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2006) (regarding violence motivated by animus
based on race, color, religion, or national origin). This is not to assume that hate
crime laws, once enacted, work out well for the intended beneficiaries. See generally
Lisa A. Crooms, "Everywhere There's a War" A Racial Realist's Reconsideration ofHate
Crime Statutes, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 41 (1999) (arguing that hate crime laws as
applied, construed, upheld, and struck down, can entrench the problems of racial
subordination that they are ostensibly aimed to combat).
180. See infra Part III. B. (regarding NYC zoning law).
181. The most recent version of this bill in the House of Representatives is The Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
182. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (2006).
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tion, but did not address gender identity."" As the voices of trans people
became louder and trans activists logged in some significant victories at
every (local, state, and federal) level 8 (despite some defeats under Title
VI 11), there were calls to add anti-discrimination coverage based on
gender identity to the bill.18 6 In October, 2007, Representative Barney
Frank (D-MA) issued a missive, urging that after years of fighting for
the passage of ENDA he thought he could get the votes in the House if
gender identity coverage were excluded from the bill.18  He must have
been stunned by the resistance he encountered. Over three hundred
GLBT organizations came together to form an ad hoc coalition called
"UnitedENDA" to push for the more inclusive version.18 Members' in-
boxes swelled with emails from the UnitedENDA organizations urging
constituents to contact members of Congress and insist that transgender
people not be left out.8
In calling for a consensus to drop the gender identity protections,
Frank had urged patience for the gradualism of law reform. 98 Patience
for gradualism is not an inherently terrible idea, but in this case scaling
back the bill was the wrong move, and the organizations were right to
oppose it-even at the risk of seeing ENDA fail-because of the toll it
183. See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, S. 2238, 103d Cong.
(1994); The Employment Non Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th
Cong. (1995).
184. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws. § 28-5-6 (5), (6), (10) (2001) (the employment provisions
passed as part of 2001-House 5920 Substitute A, which added "gender identity or
expression" to Rhode Island's general non-discrimination laws); BosToN, MASS.,
ORDINANCEs ch. 9 (2002) (providing city-level anti-discrimination coverage on the
basis of gender identity); see also Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213,
216 (1st. Cit. 2000) (permitting an action for sex discrimination against a trans-
gender loan applicant to proceed under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
185. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985) (holding that discrimination on the basis of being
transsexual is not actionable under Title VII).
186. See The Employment Non Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong.
(2007) (including protection on the basis of gender identity).
187. See Statement of Barney Frank on ENDA, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.house.gov/frank/ENDASeptember2007.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2009).
188. See GLAD, GLAD Statement on US House Passage of Limited ENDA (Nov. 8,
2007), http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/advocacy/2007-11-08-ENDApostvote.pdf
(last visited March 12, 2009).
189. Id. This announcement was issued as an email as well as a posting on GLAD's web-
site.
190. See Statement of Barney Frank on ENDA, supra note 187 ("If we were to push for a
vote now, knowing that the transgender provision would be defeated by a majority,
we would be making it harder ultimately to win that support.")
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seemed likely to take in divisiveness had they agreed to split the "GLB"
from the "T."' 9'
Stepping back a few feet from that question, however, observe how
the fight for ENDA, and over who will be covered by its provisions, is
about where to draw the line between legitimate, worthy minorities and
the acceptably marginalized. It is mired in a discourse about equality
and neglects its own role in producing norms (e.g., legitimate and ille-
gitimate minority) and identities (e.g., persons in the injured identity
categories that would be entitled to remedies under the legislation). The
bill's passage and contents hinge on just how far out Congressional
Democrats are willing to seem in the midst of a culture war in which
their Republican challengers could hold validation of homosexuality
and/or transsexuality against them at the next election cycle. As a result,
it is tough to see how such problems could be avoided. Under these
conditions, it is worth considering whether pushing for ENDA is the
right move at all. This is not to say that employment discrimination is
just fine; rather it is a call to redirect law reformist attention toward an
assessment of whether statutory protection against it is of such extraor-
dinary value as to make the effort to get ENDA passed worth whatever
it costs in divisiveness, normalization, and so on.
I am not sure what the right answer is, but I think that the question
deserves consideration and that the calculus should be fully informed as
to both costs and benefits. The premise that discrimination is bad does
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that trying to get ENDA passed is
good. There ought to be an intervening cost/benefit analysis, but it is
hard to squeeze anything in between premise and conclusion under
culture war conditions. Equality discourse seems to demand its formally
correct outcome not only in the marriage domain, but in anti-
discrimination law, as well. Standing inside equality discourse, it is diffi-
cult to see much else. Before making the judgment call, however, it
would be good if law reformers could step outside and try.
Before moving to the next part, I want to reiterate that pro-gay reli-
ance on the discursive strategies critiqued above is not random. The
strategies are, in my view, virtually impelled by a culture war in which
sexual moralists criminalize and mock same-sex intimaces,2 ground-
191. In spite of the outcry, the bill passed the House sans gender identity protections. The
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007) (as
passed). As of this writing, it has yet to come up for a vote in the Senate.
192. See, e.g., supra note 36 and accompanying text (illustrating Focus on the Family's use
of quotation marks around the word marriage).
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lessly assail gay parents"' who cannot fathom their characterization as
presumptively substandard when they devote such fierce love and labor
to their children, propose that it is legitimate to deny qualified and
dedicated people access to their chosen vocations or avocations (e.g.,
teacher or scoutmaster) because of their desires or identities,"' and so
on. My fondest hope is that this Article will not be read to demonstrate
lack of appreciation or compassion for the hardships of derision, dis-
crimination, or inhumanity.
The problem on which I am attempting to shed light is what hap-
pens when the culture war drives the agenda. The culture war provokes
pro-gay discourses of normalization and equal rights; those discourses all
but require prioritization of particular law reform efforts-eclipsing
others-and such efforts, while they have resulted in some extraordinary
successes, also have some serious pitfalls that have been accorded too
little attention." There are other things we could do.
III. RE-IMAGINING A LAW REFORM AGENDA
A. Prime Example: Homeless Adolescents
To begin with, we could accept John Edwards's invitation to con-
sider the circumstances of the young people he met at the Los Angeles
Gay and Lesbian Center. Homelessness is a huge problem among GLBT
youth,'96 and while some organizations have taken up their cause,"' the
193. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 979-80 (Mass. 2003)
(Sosman, J. dissenting).
194. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (scoutmaster); Jantz v.
Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991) (teacher).
195. In case it is not clear, I want to stress that this is a paper about law reform. The
GLBT organizations engage in all sorts of other activities (organizing, education, so-
cial services referral and delivery, etc.), and this paper is not intended as a comment
on any of those. It is strictly an analysis of what appears to be the architecture of the
GLBT law reform agenda, particularly its rights orientation and the discourse of
normalization that supports it.
196. See generally NICHOLAs RAY, NATL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST., LES-
BIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS
(2006), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/HomelessYouth.pdf;
Bryan N. Cochran et al., Challenges Faced by Homeless Sexual Minorities: Comparison
of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Homeless Adolescents With Their Heterosex-
ual Counterparts, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 773 (2002).
197. See RAY, supra note 196, at 91-152 (documenting the efforts of GLBT youth home-
less shelters, especially the Ruth Ellis Center in Detroit, Green Chimneys: Triangle
Tribe in New York City, Ozone House in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Urban Peak in
Denver, and Waltham House in Boston).
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laws that condition their lives have not drawn nearly the attention that
the marriage laws have. I investigated these conditions once before in an
effort to understand at least some of the sex work undertaken by mi-
nors, and GLBT minors in particular.9
The lives of these young people begin under a legal regime that
grants tremendous deference to their parents to raise and control them in
accord with parental values, including values that might be ungenerous
toward homosexuality or gender deviance." This deferential posture has
constitutional rootS200 but makes its real effects felt in child welfare prac-
tice, where no consensus exists as to whether seeking treatment intended
to discourage a child's homosexuality or transsexuality constitutes abuse,20'
and where neither homophobic nor transphobic attitudes typically serve
as a per se bar to adults wishing to become foster or adoptive parents.2
Perhaps as a result, a disproportionate number of runaway adolescents
identify as GLBT.203
198. See Libby Adler, An Essay on the Production of Youth Prostitution, 55 ME. L. REv. 191,
201-04 (2003). I say "some" because I learned that while some kids appear to sell sex
to survive, some do so despite the fact that they are not in material need, apparently
to buy luxury items or for pleasure or adventure. Id. at 204-06. Much of the discus-
sion in this section of the legal conditions faced by homeless youth is based on the
more elaborate analysis provided in that article.
199. Cf Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 835, 837 (1985) (noting that it is not considered "intervention" for the state
to enforce parental authority over children).
200. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
201. See Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for Puppy Love: Institutionalized Violence Against
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Youth, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 429,
458-68 (1998); Sonia Renee Martin, Note, A Child's Right To Be Gay: Addressing the
Emotional Maltreatment of Queer Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 179, 191 (1996).
202. See, e.g., 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.09(1) (2005) (prohibiting the denial of an applica-
tion for reasons of the applicant's religion). Discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is also prohibited, but when the general anti discrimination policy is read
next to the eligibility criteria to become a foster or adoptive parent, see 110 MASS.
CODE REGS. 7.104(e) (2005) ("the ability ... to respect the integrity of a child's ra-
cial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious background," but not the ability to
respect the child's gender identity or sexual orientation), the regulations do not ap-
pear to preclude homophobic-and certainly not transphobic-persons from
becoming foster or adoptive parents.
203. See RAY, supra note 196, at 1 ("Our analysis of the available research suggests that
between 20 percent and 40 percent of all homeless youth identify as lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual or transgender (LGBT). Given that between 3 percent and 5 percent of the
U.S. population identifies as lesbian, gay or bisexual, it is clear that LGBT youth ex-
perience homelessness at a disproportionate rate.").
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Once they run away (a status offense punishable in the juvenile jus-
tice system 204), their options for survival are few. Youth shelters that
receive federal funds must report the whereabouts of runaways to their
custodians within seventy-two hours. Sleeping in parks is illegal in
most places,206 and renting an apartment will not be an easy task. First,
there is a limitation on a minor's capacity to contract (called the power
of disaffirmance), which vests minors with the unilateral right to void
contracts without cause; this presumably will reduce the number of
landlords willing to offer them a lease.2 0 Second, how will a minor pay
rent? The hours that people under the age of sixteen are permitted to
work are limited by federal and state law,208 as are other aspects of youth
employment,209 and minors cannot serve as payees for their own child
210
support.
Undoubtedly, the GLBT organizations are aware of the barriers to
youth self-support and of the apparent consequence that many of these
youth turn to sex work and other criminal enterprises, 21  but the major
gay law reform efforts do not appear to be designed in contemplation of
any of these background legal conditions. 2 My principal contention is
that this can be explained by the fact that these legal issues (as opposed
to, for example, issues of discrimination) do not sound in the culture
war, making it difficult both for the movement lawyers to notice them
204. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, %§ 21, 39H (2008) (permitting arrest of persis-
tent runaways under certain circumstances).
205. See 45 C.F.R. § 1351.18(e) (2007).
206. See, e.g., 350 MASS CODE REGS. 2.01(2)(b) (2001) ("No person is allowed on [Met-
ropolitan District Commission] Reservations except during the hours from dawn to
dusk unless specified otherwise at the site, or by permit.").
207. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8.2 (4th
ed. 1998); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.4 (2d ed.
1998). In some jurisdictions the full capacity to contract would be vested in a minor
if that minor were to be emancipated, but this would likely come with the loss of any
right to support. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipat-
ing Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 245-46 (1992).
208. Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Timothy S. Brown, Protecting Society from Teenage
Greed: A Proposal for Revising the Ages, Hours and Nature of Child Labor in America,
25 AKRON L. REv. 547, 555-63 (1992).
209. See id.
210. See 45 C.F.R. § 302.38 (specifying to whom child support payments shall be made).
211. See, e.g., RAY, supra note 196, at 52.
212. See id. at 154-60. This section of Ray's report makes a number of useful policy rec-
ommendations, a couple of which scratch the surface of the kind of legal thinking
that this Article advocates, such as changing the law to "[permit minor youth, espe-
cially unaccompanied minors, to receive primary and specialty health care services
without the consent of a parent or guardian." Id. at 154.
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and for the major organizations to speak to their constituencies about
them and raise money.
In 2007, a fundraising appeal from MassEquality, a pro-same-sex
marriage organization in Massachusetts that worked to defeat the anti-
same-sex marriage constitutional amendment, arrived in my mailbox.
On the exterior of the nine-by-twelve envelope was a photograph of a
vulnerable-looking, wide-eyed boy, maybe six years old, watching televi-
sion. The text read:
Imagine it's 2008.
A small boy in Massachusetts turns on the TV-and tunes
into a $15 million campaign to single out his family and take
away his parents' equal rights.
He sees a message that says:
You do not have a real family. Real families have a mother and a
father. You're an experiment. Your life will be unhappy. Your fam-
ily isn't normal, and that' why we have the right to judge it.
Those are actual, focus-group tested arguments our opponents
are using right now.
The attack is coming. And only one thing can stop it ...
The ellipsis, of course, beckons the reader to open the envelope and
submit to the ask. Note the familiar rhetoric of equality and normalcy.
This appeal practically wrote itself.
Now try to imagine drafting the appeal to raise funds for reforming
the Department of Health and Human Services regulation against mi-
nors serving as payees for their own child support, or for addressing
common law limits on a minor's capacity to contract. It would be a lot
harder to draft that appeal, because the drafter could not simply rely on
the recipients' involuntary assumption of their culture war positions.
Maybe a more general account of GLBT youth homelessness would do
some of the work, but even that probably would not benefit from the
level of reactivity provoked by the MassEquality appeal.
No doubt each of the above-described doctrines and rules govern-
ing minors came into being for a reason, and I do not write to advocate
the total eradication of any one in particular, but there are half a dozen
legal conditions that might at least serve as starting points for a law re-
form initiative that could benefit GLBT kids. I suppose using the law to
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provide more options for youth survival would do little to advance
Eskridge's march toward formal equality, but it might be a step forward
in establishing decent conditions for young people to develop their sex-
ual habits and identities.
Of course, even if I am correct that strategies of normalization and
rights do little to help homeless GLBT adolescents, could it be that
some adolescents remain safely in their homes due in part to the success
that such strategies have had in breeding tolerance in their parents? It is
certainly possible that this is the case. My contention is not that these
strategies bring no benefit whatsoever. That benefit, however, must be
weighed against the costs. 23 The goal of Part II.B infa is to foreground
those costs, which have gone under-recognized, so that law reformers
have as much as possible in their calculus when they make strategy deci-
214
sions.
213. I would add to what is written in Part II.B supra with regard to normalization, that
the strategy does not necessarily provide even those kids who are safe at home with
safety at no cost. Rather, the safety of some of those kids could quietly be coming at
the cost of conforming (consciously or not) to the norm. That might be just fine with
someone like Eskridge, whose book title, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From
Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment, supra note 136, makes plain his idea of how
gay people ought to behave. If the title is not sufficient, the text inside will be:
It should not have required the AIDS epidemic to alert us to the problems
of sexual promiscuity and to the advantages of committed relation-
ships. . . . To the extent that males in our culture have been more sexually
venturesome (more in need of civilizing), same-sex marriage could be a
particularly useful commitment device for gay and bisexual men.
Id. at 9. It is hard to read this as anything other than sexual moralism and, particu-
larly by his use of the term "civilizing," a deep wish for acceptance into an established
norm. It should not be overlooked that it is a political choice whether to ally oneself
with the center or the margins. One who chooses the former is likely to be comfort-
able with the costs of normalization, but one whose political identification is with the
marginalized is more likely to be concerned about the costs of the norm. Recall,
though, that even a person whose identification is with the center, such as Lambda's
"boring" spokeswomen, may be paying a subtle, long-term cost in the form of the
denigration of their sex. See supra Part I.B. 1.
214. Necessarily, there is a certain amount of speculation involved. Janet Halley et al.,
From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 406 (2006) (Hila Shamir, subpt. author) (describing the
benefits of cost-benefit analysis and the complex interplay of empiricism and specula-
tion). A number of legal thinkers wrote articles in the aftermath of Lawrence that
included rich and, to my mind, highly valuable, predictive, if speculative, cost-benefit
analysis. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs: Toward a Political
Economy of Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1539 (2006); Berta E.
Hernindez-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 1151 (2004); Teemu
Ruskola, Gay Rights vs. Queer Theory: What's Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v.
Texas?, 23 SOCIAL TEXT 84-85 (2005). Some commentators have less patience for
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Imagine if the gay law reform organizations dedicated as much
brainpower, time, and money to finding ways to feed and house these
kids as they do to same-sex marriage. Imagine more generally if the gay
agenda were constructed in resistance to the culture war rather than in
reaction to it. Imagine if instead of reflexively chasing symbolic equality,
the organizations refocused their attention on the low-profile legal con-
ditions against which people live and evolve into their gendered and
sexual selves. Imagine if instead of sating their own and the anti-gay
right's appetite for titanic clashes over equality, normalcy, morality, and
legitimacy, they engaged the legal system's obscurer doctrines and rules
and spoke about them clearly to their supporters, baffling the anti-gay
right in its crusade for symbolic supremacy.21 As the next sub-part at-
tempts to demonstrate using additional examples, American Legal
Realism, Critical Legal Theory, and Queer Theory can help figure out
how to make this move.
B. Other (Appropriated) Examples Collected and Thematized
To the chagrin of some (at least me), there is an absence of genuine
understanding between lawyers (presumably mostly legal academics)
interested in theory and lawyers (academics as well as practitioners) on
the front lines of pro-gay law reform. My intent here-and the Article is
a failure if it does not do this-is to offer legal thinkers who participate
in the ongoing construction of the gay agenda some concrete ideas for
taking what I see as potentially useful theoretic interventions and put-
ting them to work. The theory utilized here is "critical" and involves
"critique." I am aware of the bad rap that critique has outside of its
small circle of devotees in law, but I beg for some patience. The bad rap,
as I understand it, stems from the impression that critique offers noth-
ing positive, is nihilist, and performs the easy task of explaining why
everything that practitioners and judges do is wrong without offering
anything reconstructive to do instead. 216 That is not quite right.
the speculative aspect of cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Beyond the
Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L.
REv. 643 (2001) (elaborately and rigorously arguing that empirical assessment would
enhance scholarship that takes up law's relationship to social norms).
215. I do not mean to imply that the anti gay right is too dim witted to notice a shift in
tack, and would not think to steer course to undermine progress. Still, it cannot hurt
to stay a few steps ahead, and moreover, to drain the fuel that comes from feeling
oneself in an historic battle to preserve so-called "family values."
216. See KENNEDY, supra note 88, at 359-63.
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Critical Legal Theory2 1  surely does resist reconstruction in the
sense that, when it is done well, it does not reconstruct a totalizing the-
ory,218 but that is not the same as neglecting to construct a law reform
agenda. In other words, you will not herein find a proposal that law re-
form should be founded on the principles of individualism or
communitarianism. You will not find a proposal that correct legal con-
clusions will be arrived at if a particular balancing test is employed, or
that certain outcomes are demanded by a principle such as formal equal-
ity. You will not find an assertion of the proper weight of moral
concerns in constitutional litigation, or any certainty in advance about
how much courts should deliberate on what constitutes "the good life."
I do not have an idea for how Hercules would approach legal prob-
lems.219 Those reconstructions are abstract and-contrary perhaps to its
reputation-Critical Legal Theory at its best is concrete.
What I am interested in here are tangible law reform ideas, ideas
such as intervening in the circumstances of homeless GLBT adolescents
by attending to the constellation of low-profile laws that constrain how
they support themselves and where they sleep. The legal conditions dis-
cussed in that example are best understood as "background conditions,"
in the sense illuminated by the American Legal Realists. The highest
profile matters in gay law reform tend to emphasize equality, anti-
discrimination, and substantive due process. These are the matters that
typically make it into State of the Union addresses, front page news arti-
cles, and state and federal supreme court decisions. They are the terms
in which pro-gay legal advocates wage the culture war. The legal issues
that more immediately affect homeless GLBT adolescents, however, are
not primarily constitutional concerns (the due process right to parent
notwithstanding), but lower-profile rules, often of a private law or ad-
ministrative nature, that frame the very poor set of choices these kids
face for self-support and housing. The Realists can teach us to shift our
focus away from the explicit law of "gay equality" and toward less obvi-
ously pertinent rules such as the extent of minors' capacity to contract.
This kind of legal analysis was developed in the context of labor law,
where the Realists saw that property and other private law doctrine, "in-
cluding such basic rules as that corporations can 'own' factories, that no
217. Careful genealogy of the different methodologies has been done by others. See gener-
ally id.; JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM (2006). Here, I intend the term Critical Legal Theory to embrace not only
the school of thought known as Critical Legal Studies, but also its antecedent Ameri-
can Legal Realism, and the importation of some aspects of Queer Theory.
218. See KENNEDY, supra note 88, at 359-63.
219. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 238-41 (1986).
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one 'owns' the ocean, that you have no legal obligation to help a starving
stranger, that workers can sell their labor and must refrain from taking
its product home," structured the employer-employee bargaining rela-
tionship even while not speaking directly to it. 2 20 Moreover, the law of
property "influence[d] the possibility and desirability of abandoning
employment altogether, 22 1 for example, by making it illegal to eat what-
ever food one happens upon if one does not own it and cannot pay for
it.222 Law operating in the background, therefore, established the realistic
range of options available to parties to an employment relationship and
thus concretely influenced their material reality far more than, say, ab-
stract assurances of their right to bargain autonomously ever could. At
first glance, contract doctrine might not appear to have anything to do
with the legal lay of the land for GLBT people, but upon closer inspec-
tion, it might open up some avenues for change that do not directly
engage the big culture war issues. For my purposes here, that is the Real-
ist contribution.
The contribution drawn from Queer Theory regards the capacity of
law to produce the identity of its subjects, as discussed supra (on the
identity-producing capacity of rights argumentation).2 23 " [J]uridical sys-
tems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to
represent." 224 As law regulates or even protects a class, it also takes part
in the formation of the group's identity.
This subpart provides a handful of additional examples drawn from
the recent work of several feminist, pro-gay, pro-sex and/or pro-trans
thinkers. These thinkers all have different reformist goals, but they share
a critical watchfulness that guards against the pitfalls of equal rights ar-
gumentation discussed in Part II, and they have the potential to shine
new light on problems (some of which are old and tiresome) and steer
reformist thinking away from discursive dead-ends. The thinkers in this
subpart seem aware of law's productive capacities and offer law reform
ideas designed to intervene in the difficulties faced by their constituen-
cies while resisting the tendency to entrench them in culture war, gender
war, or other identities that might actually limit the potential for im-
proving their circumstances in the long run. The examples that follow
220. DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes ofLaw, or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING ETc.
83, 86 (1993).
221. Id. at 87.
222. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
Sci. Q. 470, 472-73 (1923).
223. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the views of Wendy Brown, Bernard Harcourt,
Michel Foucault, and Leo Bersani).
224. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 4
(10th anniversary ed. 1999) (citing and explaining Michel Foucault).
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are intended as models for how to step outside of the mental confine-
ment of the culture war and other worn out polarities and generate new
possibilities, to wrench our eyes from equal rights and redirect attention
to those rules and doctrines that constitute the background legal condi-
tions of daily life, affecting such crucial matters as employment
opportunity and physical safety.225
To begin with, Katharine Silbaugh, a leading voice in the long-
running feminist discussion of work-family balance, wrote an article in
which she took up the possibility that some of the costs associated with
the excess burden of domestic labor on women might be alterable
through greater attention to space. 226 Historically, the problem of work-
family balance has been seen to demand changes in employment or fam-
ily law that would correct for sex-based inequalities (e.g., workplace
accommodations for working mothers or adjustments to rules governing
property distribution, alimony, and child support upon divorce, respec-
tively).22 The usual reform proposals bring up wearisome conundrums
such as meeting the needs of "most" women (who are caretakers) versus
creating remedies for women that produce them as caretakers. 228 Taking
sides about whether such proposals will do more to remedy or entrench
problems of sex-based inequality is like taking sides between reason and
passion-it will always leave you partly wrong. Could there be another
way of approaching the work-family balance problem? We do not want
to be paralyzed into inaction by old dilemmas, but neither should we
pretend not to see them.
Silbaugh has taken what could turn out to be an early step down a
new analytical path. She draws attention to areas of law that have not
traditionally been mentioned in connection with the work-family bal-
ance problem, such as single-use zoning, pointing out effects on work-
home commutes and errand-running:
225. This is to be distinguished from proposing a move toward "socio-economic rights,"
which, in my view, would be likely to replicate the problems associated with more
traditional rights, such as conflicting rights, the production of rights-bearers, and so
on.
226. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women's Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-
Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1797, 1808 (2007).
227. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 5 (2000).
228. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1495, 1528-29, 1535-36 (2001) (noting that most women are mothers, and re-
sponding to Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 183 (2001) (arguing that some feminist law reform
efforts designed to advance the interests of women as caretakers "collapse women's
identity into motherhood")).
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Some travel researchers have argued that women are more
likely to choose workplaces closer to home in order to manage
dual responsibilities. If this is so, we have workforce participa-
tion patterns determined in a gendered fashion according to
attributes of land use patterns. The landscape separating work
from home places constraints on employment decisions of
workers who take greater responsibility for family work. This
constraint on job mobility should be expected to negatively in-
fluence women's wage equality. When a worker makes a
residential decision for her family based on the location of her
employer, or an employment decision based on family, a
greater portion of family stability is tied to stability in a single
job. This should give an employer a bargaining advantage once
employment has begun, because her exit options are impaired
.... [I]f an entire area is more densely developed [than single-
use zoning generally permits], it is possible that a larger array
of employment options would be available .... This improves
a worker's exit strategy, which in turn improves her bargaining
position with her current employer.229
The article is filled with such insights, steering clear of old-school
calls for anti-discrimination measures or a shift toward or away from
legal accommodations in work or family domains. Instead, Silbaugh
examines the nitty-gritty of zoning, housing design, 230 the home mort-
gage deduction,23 1 and utility subsidies,232 and considers their possible
impact on work-family balance.
This approach has the potential to make reformist headway while
avoiding some of the wheel-spinning of the conventional positions
staked out in this longstanding debate. Silbaugh's is a Legal Realist ar-
gument in its attention to the conditions against which people choose a
job and decide what pay, hours, and so on to accept. It is also at least
consistent with (though perhaps not deliberately informed by) some of
the insights gained from thinkers cited in Part II.B.2 on the difficulties
of rights argumentation-thinkers who are associated with Critical Le-
gal Theory (e.g., Kennedy) or Queer Theory (e.g., Bersani and
Foucault)-in that she made a shift outside of old discursive confines
and is thinking in ways other than how best to serve her constituency up
for a group-based remedy. Silbaugh's article has the capacity to be a
229. Silbaugh, supra note 226, at 1826.
230. Id. at 1829-35.
231. Id. at 1844-46.
232. Id. at 1847-48.
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breakout moment-a strong heave that finally pushes the tires out of
the muddy trench. It can start a fresh conversation, with different terms
and new potential for change.
Moving back to the gay agenda, recall the discussions in Part II
regarding the shortcomings of normalization and rights discourses.
Recall the identity-entrenching, norm-producing, culture war-stoking
hazards associated with the Lexington school case and the same-sex
marriage campaign, or with hate crimes legislation or ENDA. Are
there any other ways to address the status of same-sex eroticism (of
greater or lesser domestication) or to confront the problems of physical
safety and employment for GLBT people? Are there approaches that
do not replicate the hazards of normalization/equal rights/identity-
based/anti-discrimination discourse?
As it turns out, zoning may be a fertile area of law for combating
anti-gay and anti-sex politics, as well. The administration of Mayor
Rudy Giuliani used zoning rules as a major tool in an anti-sex initiative
that affected GLBT constituencies, adult businesses, and sex workers in
New York City.233 In 1995, following a Giuliani administration study
asserting "secondary impacts" (i.e., diminishing property values and in-
creased crime) associated with the city's sex-oriented businesses,2 34 the
City Council amended the city's zoning law to, among other things, re-
strict the number, size, and placement of sexually-oriented businesses,
keeping such businesses away from houses of worship, schools, and
daycares, and also preventing such businesses from clustering. 235
As Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner argue,
The law aims to restrict any counterpublic sexual culture by
regulating its economic conditions; its effects will reach far be-
yond the adult businesses it explicitly controls. The gay bars
on Christopher Street draw customers from people who come
there because of its sex trade. The street is cruisier because of
233. See Lauren Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex in Public, 24 CRITICAL INQUIRY, 547,
551-52 (1998); Jennifer Cook, Shaken fron Her Pedestal: A Decade of New York
City's Sex Industry Under Siege, 9 N.Y. CITy L. REv. 121, 121-23, 130-39 (2005);
Eva Pendleton & Jane Goldschmidt, Sex Panic!-Make the Connections, HARV. GAY
& LESBIAN REv., July 31, 1998, at 30.
234. N.Y. City Dep't of City Planning, Publications: Adult Entertainment Study,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/pub/adultent.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2009)
(describing the Department of City Planning's 1994 Adult Entertainment Study).
235. See N.Y. City Zoning Resolution Amend. N 950384 ZRY (Oct. 25, 1995), cited in
Stringfellow's of N.Y., Ltd. v. City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 382, 392-94 (1998). See
also generally Stringfellow's of N.Y, 91 N.Y.2d at 390-94 (providing the historical
background of the amendments and explaining their provisions in a decision uphold-
ing them against a constitutional challenge).
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the sex shops. The boutiques that sell freedom rings and
"Don't Panic" T-shirts do more business for the same reasons.
Not all of the thousands who migrate or make pilgrimages to
Christopher Street use the porn shops, but all benefit from the
fact that some do. . . . The street becomes queer. It develops a
dense, publicly accessible sexual culture. It therefore becomes a
base for nonporn businesses, like the Oscar Wilde Bookshop.
And it becomes a political base from which to pressure politi-
cians with a gay voting bloc.
Moreover, the legally forced geographic dispersion of sex businesses
could put persons identified as sexual minorities at greater risk of vio-
lence as they search for businesses and each other in less concentrated
areas.237 Also, to the extent that the zoning laws actually cause the disso-
lution of existing businesses, many people will lose their jobs, perhaps
including a disproportionate number of GLBT persons who staff the
bars, t-shirt shops, and book stores.2
Some of the mainstream gay rights organizations did tune into the
significance of the Giuliani crackdown. 239 In fact, new alliances among
GLBT populations, porn buyers and sellers, and sex workers arose in
response, coalescing around shared interests (rather than shared identity)
in what became a long-running political struggle in that city.240 The
struggle did nothing to divide good gays from bad, but in fact spanned
across the interests of such archetypes. Nor was it an anti-discrimination
campaign-formal equality would be difficult even to map on this issue.
Some of the legal action did occur under a rights banner (i.e., free expres-
sion),24 1 but engagement with this local zoning law nonetheless had it all:
sex (gay and not) and the cultivation and protection of sexual culture,
political community, physical safety, and business and employment. This
is not formal equality; it is where the rubber hits the road, where bodies
gather for intimacy, community, politics, safety, and work. This can be
done.
A critical approach has begun to take hold in the legal analysis of
sex work, as well. This issue, not unlike the issue of work-family bal-
ance, has long endured the grind of irresolvable conundrums that divide
reform-minded thinkers. For example, while some people have the idea
236. Berlant & Warner, supra note 233, at 562-63.
237. See id. at 551, n.9.
238. See Pendleton & Goldschmidt, supra note 233, at 30.
239. See Berlant & Warner, supra note 233, at 551.
240. See Pendleton & Goldschmidt, supra note 233.
241. See Stringfellow's of NY, Ltd. v. City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 282, 394 (1998).
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that sex work can be a legitimately chosen profession,242 at least one sub-
set of feminists view sex work as a manifestation of women's structural
subordination to men and believe it is impossible for a woman to choose
that line of work in a genuinely autonomous sense.243 In a way, both po-
sitions are oriented toward rights and equality: the former involves the
idea that women should not be denied (either legally or by virtue of the
condescension of the structuralist position) the right to autonomous
choice, while the latter involves the idea that women's structural inequal-
ity undermines the authenticity of their autonomy. Both offer
compelling arguments in support of their positions, but suffer from a
lack of being able to know for sure.
Feminists and others concerned with the issue could carry on this
debate indefinitely, and sometimes it feels as if they have. Many of the
programmatic approaches that emerge from the debate in those terms
have been ideologically driven. Some feminists have called for "partial
decriminalization"-that is, "decriminaliz[ing] the activities of sex work-
ers" while leaving the acts of johns and third parties criminal. 24 4 This
program reflects the view that commercial sex is bad and should be
outlawed, but that the sex worker is properly regarded as a victim rather
than a culprit. Others have called for "complete decriminalization"-
that is, "the repeal of any special criminal legislation dealing with sex
work"-or "legalization," which "involves decriminalization coupled
with" any of a variety of regulatory schemes, such as "labor law,
employment law, zoning of sex businesses, compulsory medical check-
ups, licensing of sex workers, etc."245 While decriminalization proposals
might sometimes represent a pragmatic concession to the inevitability of
commercial sex, many proponents of decriminalization hold the per-
spective that the work is legitimate and chosen.246
242. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral
Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1272
(1979); Margo St. James, The Reclamation of Whores, in GooD GIRLS/BAD GIRLS:
FEMINISTS AND SEX TRADE WORKERS FACE TO FACE 81, 84-87 (Laurie Bell ed.,
1987).
243. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 57-58 (1995); Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 20,
24-25 (1993). See also Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73
S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 530-52 (2000) (coursing through the most prominent argu-
ments on the topic, feminist and not, focusing on the autonomy debate but also on
public health and other concerns).
244. Halley et al., supra note 214, at 338-39.
245. Id at 339. See also Law, supra note 243, at 552-72 (discussing numerous regulatory
regimes).
246. See Halley et al., supra note 214, at 347 (Chantal Thomas, subpt. author) (explaining
two feminist perspectives on prostitution and trafficking as "'structuralist' or radical
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Feminist advocates of these two types seem to "imagine their fa-
vored criminal law reform to operate simply by actually eliminating
precisely and only the conduct it outlaws" without contemplating how
the different components of the formal legal regime might, combined
with varying levels of enforcement, constitute the bargaining conditions
among the relevant parties and affect the kinds of choices sex workers
and others make.24 This tunnel vision might easily be the result of the
discourse in which many advocates are engaged, in which the autonomy
or victimhood of the sex worker, and the resulting legitimacy or not of
the work, is the overriding point.
Is there a reformist approach to sex work that avoids the tedium of
the dispute over autonomy? Can we generate any new law reform pro-
posals or think about this issue in any other way?
Eliyanna Kaiser, Executive Editor of $pread Magazine (a magazine
about the sex industry that appears to be aimed primarily at a sex-
worker readership), speaking on a panel at Harvard Law School, pointed
to the concrete significance of some specific legal conditions, such as
whether the volume of condoms on one's person at the time of arrest is
admissible as evidence of criminal conduct; if so, we might expect sex
workers not to carry a volume sufficient to protect themselves and their
customers on a given night.2 4 8 If the home of the john is the venue least
subject to police intrusion and enforcement, then sex workers might be
more vulnerable to violent johns than they would be given a broader
choice of locales with low arrest risk.2 49 (This could also drive up the
price of sex in a car.) If the exchange of sex for money is legal, but the
act of soliciting is not (as in Canada2"), then street sex workers will be
forced to make snap decisions about whether to get into a car with a
john, lacking the time to linger in the car window and assess the safety
of the situation, again, leaving them more vulnerable than necessary.251
In Sweden, sex work has been decriminalized, but the john's act of pur-
approaches that endorse an abolitionist [i.e., partial decriminalization] approach[,]
... and 'individualist' or liberal/libertarian approaches that contemplate the possibil-
ity that some prostitution is consensual ... and consequently that are amenable to
greater decriminalization or legalization.").
247. Id. at 340 (offering hard-nosed ideas, guided by insights drawn from American Legal
Realism, for shifting the analysis of various feminist legal concerns, including sex
work, toward consequentialism and cost-benefit analysis).
248. Eliyanna Kaiser, Remarks at Unbound: Harvard Journal of the Legal Left Speaker
Series: Beyond Coercion: Radical Voices on Sex Work, Feminism and the Law (April
16, 2008).
249. Id.
250. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 213 (1985); Law, supra note 243, at
555 (citing Martin's Annual Criminal Code: 1973, § 195.1 (1973)).
251. Kaiser, supra note 248.
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chasing sex is criminal.252 Kaiser claims that the results have been declin-
ing prices and a shrinking client population, with many of the
remaining johns being the most anti-social and dangerous.253
Sex work is not just a women's issue2 4 but a GLBT issue as well in
that the GLBT population, including its youth, is over-represented in
the industry.255 The pertinence of some legal and economic conditions
might vary by sub-population. For example, the availability and cost of
hormones or sex reassignment surgeries would form a background con-
dition for at least some transgender sex workers whose choices might be
partially determined by powerfully felt needs for medical treatments for
which they lack insurance coverage.256 Access to decent and affordable
child care, on the other hand, would probably be a more prominent
concern for mothers in the trade who might leave their children sleeping
252. Id.. See also Halley et al., supra note 214, at 396 (Hila Shamir, subpt. author) (dis-
cussing the Swedish model citing Lag om f5bud mot kop av sexualla (Svensk
farfattningssamling [SFS] 1999:408) (Swed.), revoked and replaced in 2005 by
Brottsbalken [BrB] [Criminal Code] 6:11 (Swed.)).
253. See also Halley et al., supra note 214, at 396 (Hila Shamir, subpt. author) (observing
that while structuralist feminists view the Swedish legal reform as a triumph, critics
argue that sex work merely "went deeper underground" which resulted in "worse
working conditions, lower pay, greater dependence on pimps, and higher health risks
to sex workers"); Law, supra note 243, at 568-69 ("[P]rostitute activists argue [that
laws punishing customers will cause m]en who are married, with respectable careers
and a reputation to protect," to avoid the risk of exposure, while "men who are
criminally inclined . . . will not be discouraged."). Kaiser also reports the fascinating
consequence in Sweden of women posing as sex workers in order to rob johns, who
cannot report the robberies without risking arrest for having attempted to purchase
sex. Kaiser, supra note 248.
254. This is not to deny that sex work and its regulation have significant implications for
women. Mary Joe Frug's argument that anti-prostitution rules have productive ef-
fects on women by "formally preserv[ing] the distinction between legal and illegal
sexual activity," effectively presenting women with a choice between the role of
wife/mother and that of whore, suggests that the regulation of sex work has signifi-
cance for women generally, not merely for those who practice the trade. See MARY
JOE FRUG, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, in POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM
125, 134 (1992).
255. See RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITA-
ION OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S., CANADA AND MEXICO: FULL REPORT OF THE U.S.
NATIONAL STUDY 72 (2001), http://www.sp2.upenn.edu/,restes/CSEC.htm; RAY,
supra note 196, at 55; Cochran et al., supra note 196, at 773; Jody M. Greene et al.,
Prevalence and Correlates ofSurvival Sex Among Runaway and Homeless Youth, 80 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH, 1406, 1408-09 (1999).
256. See ESTES & WEINER, supra note 255, at 61 (explaining that access to such treatments
has been an important area of law reform by the major GLBT law reform organiza-
tions). See, e.g., GLAD: Our Work: Cases: In re Rhiannon O'Donnabhain, http://
www.glad.org/work/cases/in-re-rhiannon-odonnabhain/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2009)
(describing GLAD's work in an ongoing dispute in U.S. Tax Court over whether sex
reassignment surgery is a deductible medical expense).
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at home at night with the idea that the neighbor has one ear out for
them, but who feel less comfortable leaving them alone during the day-
time. Other conditions, such as the nature and extent of police
enforcement and/or abuse, would be of universal concern, even if the
conditions themselves differ by sub-population, venue (e.g., escort ser-
vices vs. street prostitution), neighborhood, and so on.
In any case, the conditions on the ground are likely to be factors in
each person's decision about whether to engage in sex work, as well as
what kind or how much to engage in, how much risk to take in pursuit
of a trick, whether to serve as police informants, and so on. If one's con-
cern is with the safety and well-being of sex workers, these sorts of
concrete legal conditions might be good places to intervene. Abstract
and irresolvable debates about autonomy seem less promising. We could
insist on ideological victory ("I chose this work!" "No, you didn't!"),25
or hold our breath for the arrival of true equality between men and
women, gays and straights, or trans and non-trans people to see who was
right, but if we tune our legal minds to a different channel, we might
actually be able to change some legal conditions that have concrete ef-
fects on real people's lives.
In the transgender domain, reformers have succeeded in getting
some state and local anti-discrimination laws enacted and have had
mixed results in obtaining anti-discrimination coverage by other
means.258 Some of these efforts surely have raised the profile of the issue
and emboldened and organized the constituency. On the other hand,
they come with the same hazards discussed above (identity produc-
tion/entrenchment, provocation of competing rights,259 obscuring of law
reform possibilities other than formal equality, etc.).
257. Sylvia Law reports that in France, a feminist legislator named Marthe Richard was a
moving force behind legislation that closed the brothels in that country, but that after
the legislation took effect and the apparent consequences were increased "venereal
diseases, public solicitation, ... police corruption ... [and sex workers' dependency]
upon pimps," she then attempted to reverse her previous reform. Law, supra note
243, at 555-56. Based on this telling, Marthe Richard is my feminist heroine, be-
cause she bravely permitted the consequences of the initial reform to dislodge her
from a position rooted in ideology.
258. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing ENDA).
259. An example of a competing right that might be provoked by pro-trans rights argu-
mentation is the right of women not to encounter biological males in a public
women's restroom. Cf Goines v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 721, 726 (2001)
(dismissing discrimination claim made by a transgender-employee plaintiff). In
Goines, the defendant-employer understood the complaints of the other women em-
ployees against their transgender co-worker for using the women's restroom to be "a
hostile work environment concern." Id. at 721.
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Widespread public recognition of gender identity concerns and of
transgender people is comparatively recent,260 So some reformers might
be inclined to follow the anti-discrimination, equal rights, normalization
reform model upon which pro-gay law reformers have most often relied.
There are, however, other options.
Some thinkers in this area have been keenly attentive to the power
of all sorts of low-profile bureaucratic rules to produce gender while
regulating daily life at the micro level. Dean Spade, for example, has
written an elaborate analysis of conflicting standards for establishing
one's changed sex for purposes of state motor vehicle departments, the
Social Security Administration, and state vital statistics bureaus, or for
purposes of placement in prisons, homeless shelters, group homes for
foster children, or other typically sex-segregated settings. 261 As Spade
explains,
[T]he terms and categories used in the classification of data
gathered by the state do not merely collect information about
pre-existing types of things, but rather shape the world into
those categories, often to the point where those categories are
taken for granted by most people and appear ahistorical and
apolitical.262
Taken for granted though they may be, the criteria for placement in
the categories are wildly inconsistent. Spade demonstrates a clash among
formal and discretionary bureaucratic definitions of male and female for
all sorts of purposes. To qualify as a sex other than the one originally
assigned at birth, the Social Security Administration, for example,
requires medical documentation of sex reassignment surgery,263 while state
motor vehicle departments may maintain any of a range of requirements,
from sex reassignment surgery to a physician's letter regarding the person's
predominant gender identity, to a court order based on what could easily
be ad hoc judicial criteria for sex assignment, 2 6  to a case-by-case
260. See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and
Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11
MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. 253, 292-97 (2005) (recounting recent advances).
261. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGs L.J. 731 (2008). See also Darren
Rosenblum, 'Trapped' in Sing-Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender Bi-
narism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 536-52 (2000) (explaining the difficulties of
transgender prisoner placement and evaluating the costs and benefits of several possi-
ble approaches to the issue).
262. Spade, supra note 261, at 745.
263. Id. at 762.
264. Id. at 771-72.
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determination relying on a department employee's "common sense
view.265 Likewise, policy-makers and front-line personnel at sex-
segregated facilities can make any of a wide range of decisions that
determine who gains access to, for example, a particular shelter, dorm or
bathroom.266 Such placement obviously could have an impact on a
person's physical safety (i.e., if one is perceived to be in the wrong
place) .
Moreover, conflicting determinations of a person's sex can cause
additional trouble in this era of the War on Terror, as a result of such
practices as "batch checking" in which "different data-gathering agencies
compare records to find individuals with non-matching information" in
an effort to uncover falsely obtained documents.26 8 If the identifying
information held on a single individual by multiple agencies does not
line up, it can result in suspension of a driver's license or notification of
the problem to a person's employer.269
Spade calls in his article for a large-scale reduction in the use of
gender as an identifying term, and asks readers not to take for granted
that every bureaucratic entity is entitled to maintain gender-related in-
formation.270 This may or may not be the right solution to the problems
he raises. To my mind, the great value of Spade's analysis is that it draws
attention away from the simple call for anti-discrimination coverage and
toward lower profile rules that can have an imminent impact on a per-
son's safety, employment, licensure, or access to facilities or services.
Moreover, rather than neglecting to notice the ways in which laws-
even good laws-produce identity, Spade zeroes in precisely on the law's
identity-productive capacities. I doubt that Spade or anyone else can
come up with a way to avoid the legal production of identity altogether,
but it is still worthwhile, again for purposes of a fully informed strategic
calculus, to evaluate what is being produced by the law's categories and
how that affects real life. 27 Law reformers in this area can choose to run
265. Id. at 772.
266. Id. at 775-77.
267. Id. at 753.
268. Id. at 799-801.
269. Id
270. Id at803, 819-20.
271. A group of activists, academics, and others came together in 2006 to issue a statement
entitled "Beyond Same-Sex Marriage" that advocates a reworking of the distribution
mechanisms for such benefits as health coverage in a way that would deprivilege the
marital couple. See BEYOND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A NEW STRATEGIC VISION FOR
ALL OUR FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS (2006), http://www.beyondmarriage.org/
BeyondMarriage.pdf. They point to polyamorous relationships, friends or siblings liv-
ing together, adults living with and caring for elderly parents, and other
arrangements, and urge the allocation of benefits in ways that would not disadvantage
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headlong down the path of normalization and rights, or they can try
instead to engage the low-profile rules that are quietly producing gender
identity and distributing jobs, safety, and services.
The law reform approaches described above do not share a focal
equality objective. Read one after another, their goals might seem a bit
dispersed, but that is exactly the point. What they share is attentiveness
to legal conditions happening at the ground level rather than at the
height of constitutional vindication. Their aims are varied but concrete,
in the details of daily life.
None is intended (by me) as a specific law reform proposal. Rather,
I collect, summarize, and thematize them to demonstrate that there are
alternatives to the dominant gay rights agenda and that to critique that
agenda and highlight its costs does not leave reformers with nothing to
do. Full throttle engagement in the monumental confrontation between
moralism and rights might be the most visible option, but it is not the
only option. Strategic thinking should involve thorough evaluation of
many viable possibilities. This section is meant to bring a handful of
those possibilities into view and to promote a critical approach to
agenda-setting.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rights such as equality are limited in their capacity to advance the
full range of interests of multiple sexual and gender constituencies and
every representation of these constituencies hazards exclusion and harm.
This is not to say that conventional equality-seeking strategies have no
benefits or should never be used. Rather, the point has been to confront
their costs and to demonstrate that, despite how things may seem under
people in these groupings. Id. The statement does not oppose same-sex marriage, but
rather urges that same-sex marriage not serve as the "only strategy" for increasing
recognition of family forms and redistributing benefits. Id. While I sympathize with
the overarching goal of getting "beyond same-sex marriage" and the good will of this
group toward people living in all sorts of ways and needing access to societal benefits,
the statement comes off as naive, particularly in its concluding call for a "future
where all people will be truly free." Id. The drafters seem to imagine that there is
some way in which the government could recognize everything as legitimate, and not
be guilty of any norm-setting. I would urge thinkers inclined to an ideal of getting
the government out of our lives or, conversely, having the government legitimize
every conceivable formation, to recalibrate their analysis to the very specific effects of
each law or doctrine and its norm-setting and distributive capacities. Instead of hop-
ing that a strong push in one direction or the other will remedy a mass of inequalities
all at once, assess each detail for its costs and benefits and make difficult judgment
calls, sometimes between costs for one constituency one cares about and benefits to
another.
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culture war conditions, they are not the only options for constructing a
law reform agenda. The approaches presented as examples in this paper
are not silver bullets and may well carry costs of their own, but I hope
they will contribute something useful to a process of re-imagining the
possibilities for reform. t
